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The Supreme Court has grappled with the constitutional limits
on discrimination in the jury selection process for over one hundred
years, beginning with decisions in 18791 involving state laws and prac-
tices that excluded blacks from sitting on juries altogether. In the last
nine years alone, the Court has decided six significant cases concern-
ing alleged racial discrimination in jury composition.
2
Nor is race the only kind ofjury selection discrimination that has
been challenged. For example, in cases involving the Sixth Amend-
ment rights of criminal defendants, the Court has held that women
cannot be excluded from the jury process, at least at the venire consti-
tution stage.3 And just last term, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,4 the
Court held unconstitutional a State's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude men from a civil jury. These cases, and the line-drawing
problems they obviously present, indicate a rather desperate need for
t Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; A.B., University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. I would like to thank Albert Al-
schuler, Akhil Reed Amar, Alan Brownstein, Evan Caminker, Floyd Feeney, Kevin R.
Johnson, and John Oakley for their helpful input
1 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (finding exclusion of black
jurors to be a violation of black defendant's equal protection rights); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879) (upholding provision of federal civil rights law prohibiting exclusion of
blacks from juries).
2 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges in a race-based manner); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (prohibiting private civil litigants from exercising per-
emptory challenges in a race-based manner); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)
(upholding trial court's finding that prosecutor's explanations for certain peremptory
challenges of hispanic jurors were sufficiently race neutral under Batson framework); Pow-
ers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that white criminal defendant has standing
under Equal Protection Clause using Batson framework to challenge the prosecutor's strike
of racial minorities); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (concluding that white crimi-
nal defendant has standing to challenge under Sixth Amendment prosecution's peremp-
tory removal of black jurors, but rejecting claim on the merits because Sixth Amendment's
cross-section requirement has no application to peremptories); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (permitting black criminal defendant to challenge prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges to remove minority jurors under Equal Protection Clause and setting
up framework for resolving factual question of racial motivation).
3 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
4 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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a constitutional theory to identify the groups whose exclusion from or
underrepresentation on juries ought to be troubling. The Sixth
Amendment, which was invoked by the Court in the 1970s,5 is not by
itself very useful in this regard because the amendment tells us only
about the circumstances under which juries must be provided, not
about how juries must be constituted.
One option, which the Court has begun to embrace 6 and which
some commentators have supported,7 is an approach based on the
Equal Protection Clause.8 Under this approach, exclusion ofjurors is
unconstitutional to the extent that it deprives would-be jurors of their
equal protection rights. This approach does not, of course, necessar-
ily provide easy answers to the line-drawing problems. On the one
hand, equal protection analysis is somewhat flexible and, depending
on who is doing the analysis, conceivably broad enough to raise ques-
tions about a variety of jury selection criteria.9 And on the other
hand, an equal protection approach might be too narrow to suit some
people. For example, wealth and age are two criteria whose use does
not trigger any heightened scrutiny under traditional equal protec-
tion analysis, and yet use of these criteria may be troubling in the jury
context. Indeed, as we shall see, the Court has already (and quite
properly) suggested that the use of wealth classifications in jury selec-
tion is disturbing.10
But the real problem with a traditional Equal Protection Clause
approach is not that the results such an approach yields might not
placate everyone, but rather that the very application of the Clause to
the jury context is fundamentally at odds with the text and history of
the reconstruction amendments," of which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is but one. As I argue below, jury service, like voting and office
holding, was conceived of as a political right, as distinguished from a
civil right, and political rights were excluded from the coverage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Constitution speaks to the ex-
clusion of groups from jury service most directly through the voting
amendments, beginning with the Fifteenth and running through the
Twenty-Sixth. And the groups protected from discrimination by these
5 See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. 357; Taylor, 419 U.S. 522.
6 This is not to say that the Court has accepted this approach to the exclusion of all
others. Indeed, the Court has said nothing to suggest that it no longer considers its Sixth
Amendment cases good law. Although I think a Sixth Amendment approach may be less
than ideal, I do not agree with those who argue that it necessarily lacks coherence. See infra
note 40 and part III.C.
7 See, e.g., infra note 40.
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10 See infra notes 222-38 and accompanying text.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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voting amendments are not the same groups that are protected under
a traditional equal protection approach.
There is reason to hope that the Court will understand the close
linkage between jury service and voting as part of a political rights
package. For example, in Powers v. Ohio,12 where a criminal defendant
alleged that the govemment's peremptory challenges were race based,
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court observed that "with the ex-
ception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury
duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the demo-
cratic process."13 Justice Kennedy then translated his populist obser-
vations about jury service into constitutional doctrine by tapping into
the voting discrimination framework. Borrowing language from an
earlier case, Kennedy affirmed that "[w] hetherjury service be deemed
a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some
of its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invid-
iously discriminate in the offering and withholding of the elective
franchise."1
4
Later in the same term, Justice Kennedy, again writing for the
Court, invoked the similarity between jury service and voting, this time
to support the proposition that peremptory challenges by private liti-
gants may constitute state action. Relying on "white primary" cases in
which states had delegated election administration responsibility to
private associations that discriminated against black voters, Justice
Kennedy's opinion observed that just as government cannot escape
from constitutional constraints by farming out the task of picking vot-
ers, neither can it free itself from constitutional norms by giving pri-
vate parties the power to pick jurors.15
This "juror as voter" theme injustice Kennedy's opinions has sur-
face plausibility. After all, jurors vote to decide the winners and losers
in caes-that is what they do. Thus, the plain meaning of various
constitutional provisions concerning the "right to vote" literally ap-
plies to jurors. Beyond this plain meaning, jury service eligibility his-
torically has been tied to voter registration as a general matter. 16
12 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
13 Id. at 407.
14 Id. at 408 (quoting Carter v.Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)). See alsoJ.E.B.
v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423 (alluding to, but not explaining the relevance of,
the Nineteenth Amendment in the discussion of women's right to serve on juries).
15 ' Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1991).
16 Se , e.g., ALMS DE TocoumVI, DEMOCRACY IN AMEIucA app. I at 702 (J. P. Mayer
& Max Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., 1966); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., juries, Jurisdic-
tion, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise ofStrauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv.
1401, 1467, 1469 n.360, 1475 n.399 (1983); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimina-
tion injuty Selection: Whose Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 746 (1992) (citing
instances in which state jury eligibility was tied to voting eligibility); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1863(b) (2) (1988) (directing federal districts to select grand and petitjurors from voter
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As I hope to demonstrate, however, the connection runs deeper
still. The argument of this Article is that the link between jury service
and other rights of political participation such as voting is an impor-
tant part of our overall constitutional structure, spanning three centu-
ries and eight amendments: the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth. As we shall
see, the voting-jury service linkage was recognized by the Framers in
the 1780s,17 by those responsible for drafting the reconstruction
amendments and implementing legislation,' 8 and still later by authors
of twentieth century amendments that protect various groups against
discrimination in voting.19 Mdreover, each of the groups the
Supreme Court has already determined should be protected against
discrimination in jury service is also protected by one of the voting
discrimination amendments.20
One kind of group the Court has yet to protect against jury ser-
vice discrimination is that defined by age, especially young adults. I
argue that age-defined groups, like other groups protected by the
Constitution against discrimination in voting, are essential partici-
pants in the jury process as well. Thus, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Amendments (providing for juries) must be harmonized with the
spirit of the Twenty-Sixth (dealing with age discrimination), just as
they have already in effect been brought into alignment with the Fif-
teenth (dealing with racial discrimination), Nineteenth (dealing with
gender discrimination), and Twenty-Fourth (dealing with class, dis-
crimination). In the end, the groups protected from discrimination,
injury service should be the same groups protected from discrimina-
tion in vdting, regardless of how these groups fare under -Sixth,
Amendment or equal protection approaches.
Part I provides background on the doctrinal framework that has
evolved to address juror exclusion. This Part includes a discussion of
the age-based group cases and the slippery slope problems that have,
led lower courts to refuse to recognize age as an unconstitutional basis
for juror exclusion. Part I concludes by suggesting that an under-
standing of the relationship between jury service and other rights of
political participation answers the slippery slope problems. Part II
pursues that suggestion by exploring the link between jury service and
other rights of political participation, especially voting, in the found-
registration lists or lists of actual voters). This is not to say that voting eligibility has always
been necessary or sufficient to confer jury service eligibility. See, e.g., BARBARA BABCOCK ET
AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, CAUSES AND REMEDIES 68 (1975) (discussing histori-
cal examples ofjury service in states where jury duty was not based on enfranchisement).
17 See infra part II.A.1.
18 See infra part II.A2.a.
19 See infra parts II.A.2.b-d.
20 See infra discussion part IIA.3.
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ing period, the reconstruction, the later voting discrimination amend-
ments, and Supreme Court case law. Part III then elaborates on the
ways in which the central insight of this Article-the location ofjury
service in the broader context of political participation rights pro-
tected by the voting discrimination amendments-may be incorpo-
rated into the doctrinal framework employed by the Court. Whether
or not we completely abandon the equal protection and Sixth Amend-
ment approaches to the jury exclusion cases, we need to accommo-





Since Batson v. Kentuckyf' was decided nine years ago, much aca-
demic attention has been paid to Supreme Court cases involving the
constraints the Constitution may place on the exercise of peremptory
challenges.22 TheJE.B. case involving the State's use of peremptories
to exclude men23 is certain to generate more commentary. This Arti-
cle analyzes aspects of the decision below. 24 But even as we focus on
these post-Batson cases, we must not forget that in some ways they are
second-generation jury exclusion cases.25 The first generation ofjury
exclusion cases involved discrimination in constituting the venires
from which individual jury panels are chosen. These cases concerned
challenges to the ways in which the key man system operated 26 or the
permissibility of certain broad exemptions of groups from jury ser-
21 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
22 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153 (1989); Barbara A. Babcock,
A Placr in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Juy Service, 61 U. GIN. L. REv. 1139 (1993);
Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symme-
try and the Juy in a Criminal Trial 102 HAtv. L. REV. 808 (1989); Underwood, supra note 16.
23 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
24 See infra notes 41-43, 238 and accompanying text.
25 Cf Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent inEqual Protection, 41 STAN. L. Rev. 1105, 1119-
20 (1989) (distinguishing between these "two major types ofjury discrimination cases").
26 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Franklin v. South Carolina 218 U.S. 161, 168 (1910).
Under a key man system, citizens of good reputation in the community (the "key" men)
recommend persons to fill thejury venire. Notwithstanding the highly subjective nature of
such recommendations, the Supreme Court has declined to hold that the key man system
itself is constitutionally impermissible; instead, it has held that when a key man system is
administered in an intentionally racially discriminatory way, it runs afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Until 1968, the federal government operated on the key man system. Pursuant to the
1968Jury Selection and Service Act, federal jury venires are now drawn from federal jury
wheels, which in turn are randomly filled with names drawn from a source list consisting
primarily of voter registration lists. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1988).
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vice.27 It is in these cases that the principles underlying the Court's
resolution of the second generation of jury exclusion cases were ini-
tially formulated.
28
The first Supreme Court case to consider the jury exclusion issue
was Strauder v. West Virginia,29 in which a black criminal defendant suc-
cessfully argued that the exclusion of all blacks from the jury venire
rendered his conviction unconstitutional. Although Strauder spoke in
terms of the right of the criminal defendant to the equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment,"0 the opinion has
spawned a number of other theories about jury discrimination as
well.31 These theories coalesce to form the imperative of a "fairly
comprised jury," which the Court has invoked in many cases involving
exclusion of racial minorities and women from jury venires.
By the mid-1980s it was commonplace for federal courts to speak
of the "requirement that a jury be drawn from a cross-section of the
community," yet the source of this requirement was unclear. The only
certainty has been the Court's unwillingness to let stand any verdict
rendered by a 'Jury" constituted in violation of the cross-section com-
mand. As one appellate court trying to cover all its bases put it, the
Supreme Court has "grounded" the cross-section requirement in the
Equal Protection Clause, the supervisory power of the federal courts,
and the Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the itates
through the Fourteenth.32
A central question raised by these cases-a question that arises
regardless of the constitutional provision(s) under which one is chal-
lenging the exclusion of would-be jurors-is which groups cannot
constitutionally be excluded? Indeed, to paraphrase one commenta-
As of 1977, the following 16 states utilized a key man system: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampslhire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West'Vir-
ginia. JoN M. VAN DyE, JuRY SELECtION PROCEDuREs 86-87 (1977). While most of these
states have since revised their jury selection procedures, some states still empl9y a.version
of the key man system. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-40 (1990).
27 See, e.g., Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (upholding statutory exclusion of
persons in certain occupations-including lawyers, preachers, ministers, doctors, engi-
neers, dentists, and railroad firemen-from jury service).
28 Others have also made this observation. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 16, at 742.
29 100 U.S. at 303.
30 Id. at 309.
31 See Underwood, supra note 16, at 742.
32 Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 984, vacated en ban4 772 F.2d 982, 996 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). Justice Marshall's plurality opinion for the Court
in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972), suggests his belief that the requirement also
stems from the Due Process Clause itself, regardless of the "incorporation"'of other rights
that clause might effect. See also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 n.* (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (discussing the way in which the various doctrinal bases for the jury
exclusion cases overlap and meld, and calling majority's approach a "hybrid" between the
Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause).
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tor, any workable theory of jury exclusion must, at a minimum, ex-
plain which groups count and why.8 3 The cases have analyzed this
issue in terms of whether a group is "cognizable," and have borne out
the centrality, as well as the difficulty, of the cognizability question.
Taylor v. Louisiana,34 where the Court made clear that women
were a constitutionally cognizable group for purposes of a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment claim, is illustrative. Quoting exten-
sively from the its opinion thirty years earlier in Ballard v. United
States,35 the Court emphatically rejected the notion that women's par-
ticipation is not essential to the jury process. However, the Court
could articulate its reasoning only in intuitive terms:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made
up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of
both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among
the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not
in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded.36
Identification of "distinct qualities" and "flavors" of groups opens
the courts to the charge that they are making up constitutional law.
Fo'r example, four terms after Taylor Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Duren v. Missouri accused the Court in the juror exclusion line of cases
of: rsort[ing] to ... mystical incantations,"37 and expressed misgiv-
ings about accepting on faith the Court's "omniscience... as to the
'existence of 'unknowable' qualities of human nature, 'flavor[s]' and
'aidefinable something[s].' "38
* As Justice Rehnquist's sarcastic remarks suggest, the Court in Tay-
or'and Duren had obvious difficulty in explaining why ajury on which
women are underrepresented is not really a 'Jury" for purposes of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Perhaps this difficulty explains
wl-y, in. more recent cases, "concern for the jury as an institution ha[s]
become the centerpiece of the analysis," and that "the rights of ex-
cluded jurors rather than those of litigants are paramount. "39 This
shjft in focus underlies the Court's increased reliance on the equal
33 See Underwood, supra note 16, at 738.
34 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
35 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
36 Taylo, 419 U.S. at 531-532 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94
(1946)) (emphasis added).
.37 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (alterations in original). See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986)
(discussing problems with defining "distinctive groups" for purposes of Sixth
Amendment).
39 Babcock, supra note 22, at 1154 (emphasis added).
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protection rights of would-be jurors, a doctrinal move some commen-
tators have welcomed as an intellectual improvement.4
0
This is not to say that the Court has abandoned its Sixth Amend-
ment decisions or their rhetoric; it has not. Indeed, one remarkable
feature of the most recent cases is the incorporation of Sixth Amend-
ment rhetoric into equal protection reasoning.41 In fact, the two anal-
yses are in a great deal of tension: whereas the Sixth Amendment
"flavor" approach values a group's input into the jury process because
the group has characteristics that make it different from other groups
in society, the Court's recent Equal Protection Clause cases deny any
relevant differences between the excluded and included groups at all.
Use of certain jury selection criteria is invalid under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause reasoning because the criteria are themselves irrelevant,
and their use reflects nothing more than stereotypical thinking.42
Notwithstanding any tension with earlier reasoning, the Court
seems to be setting on the equal protection approach. According to
its adherents, this approach would prohibit race and gender-based
jury selection decisions but would not protect against wealth or age
discrimination, among others.43 Close analysis of the treatment of
age-based groups provides a helpful backdrop for the historical and
doctrinal analyses that follow.
40 See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 16, at 742. In her thoughtful essay, then-Professor
Underwood concludes that the only workable doctrinal basis on which to explain the juror
exclusion cases is the Equal Protection Clause's protection of the excluded jurors, and the
antidiscrimination principle it embodies. She rejects a Sixth Amendment approach as fun-
damentally flawed because the Sixth Amendment theory can tell us only that a jury is re-
quired in certain cases, and not what groups must be included for a body to be a "jury" in
the constitutional sense.
As I argue below, I believe the best approach to resolve the jury exclusion cases is one
which focuses on the political participation of the excluded jurors and which directly in-
vokes the voting discrimination amendments. As I demonstrate below, an equal protection
approach is difficult if not impossible to square with the text, structure, and history of the
Reconstruction Amendments. See infra part II. A Sixth Amendment approach, while per-
haps not as intellectually neat as a direct voting discrimination approach, can at least over-
come Underwood's objection once we explore the link between voting and jury service.
This linkage, together with the voting right amendments, could be used to identify the
groups whose exclusion renders a body less than a "jury" in the constitutional sense. See
infra part III.C.
Even if the Equal Protection Clause proves, for stare decisis reasons, the appropriate
doctrinal lens through which to analyze these cases, the antidiscrimination principle which
Underwood describes must be modified to take account of the groups-like young adults
and the poor-who are explicitly protected by the Constitution from voting discrimination
but who are not beneficiaries of traditional equal protection heightened scrutiny. See infra
part III.B.
41 See, e.g., J.E.B v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994).
42 Id. at 1424-25.
43 See Underwood, supra note 16, at 765-66. Cf JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
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B. The Age Group Issue
There are hundreds of federal and state cases involving exclusion
from juries of groups defined by age, particularly cases involving ex-
clusion or underrepresentation of young adults.44 Some states have
enacted statutes that require jurors to be twenty-one, thereby exclud-
ing adults between eighteen and twenty-one.45 At times, the key man
system 46 employed by many jurisdictions has been used explicitly to
weed out young adults.47 Moreover, parties exercising peremptory
challenges sometimes acknowledge openly their discrimination on the
basis of age.48 And, most commonly, the young are systematically un-
derrepresented due to the infrequent refilling of juror wheels 49 in
federal and state courts.
50
Litigants seeking to challenge these exclusions must, of course,
surmount the cognizability hurdle. The closest the Supreme Court
has come to ruling on the cognizability of young adultgroups was its
decision in Hamling v. United States,51 which involved several persons
convicted under federal statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene
materials. The defendants in Hamling, in addition to challenging the
constitutionality of the federal obscenity statutes, 52 objected to the
petit jury panel on the ground that there had been an unconstitu-
tional exclusion of all persons under twenty-five years of age from the
venire.5 3 Specifically, the defendants claimed that the Southern Dis-
trict of California's method of periodically emptying and refilling its
master jury wheel from voter registration lists effectively excluded
44 For a good collection of cases through the late 1970s, see Donald H. Zeigler, Young
Adults as a Cognizable Group injury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1045 (1978) (arguing that
social science data supports cognizability of age groups). More recent decisions that col-
lect many other recent cases include United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th
Cir. 1988); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1000 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1050 (1986); and People v. Bridget, 527 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 1988).
45 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (1972); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 494.425 (1989).
46 See supra note 26.
47 See, e.g., United States ex rel Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611, 613 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971) (relating to New York County officials' discrimina-
tion on the basis of age in the solicitation of grand jurors).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 996 (1988) (upholding government's exercise of peremptory challenges on basis of
age).
49 See supra note 26 for an explanation ofjuror wheels. Federal law requires refilling
with names of voters only every four years, see 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (b) (4) (1988), so that
persons between 18 and 22 become increasingly and predictably excluded as time elapses
from the most recent refilling.
50 See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. Smith, 523
F.2d 771, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); United States v. Ware,
473 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D.
Fla. 1973).
51 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
52 Id. at 98-124.
53 Id. at 135-38.
1995]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. 54 At the
time of trial, slightly less than four years had elapsed since the wheel
in the district had been refilled, which meant that the youngest poten-
tial jurors for the trial were at least twenty-four years old.55
In treating this claim, the Court assumed without deciding that
young people are a cognizable group for constitutional purposes.56
The Court nonetheless rejected the claim, finding that defendants
had failed to make out a prima facie case of constitutional violation
sufficient to place the burden on the government to justify the effec-
tive exclusion by reference to governmental objectives.57 The then-
prevailing constitutional doctrine required a showing of "purposeful
discrimination" in the jury exclusion context.58 Such a showing could
presumably be made in jurisdictions that exclude by law adults under
a certain age.59 Had the Court been faced with such a scheme, it
would have had to decide whether young adults are cognizable. But
in Hamling, young adults technically were eligible for service under
the federal jury statute linking jury service to voting. Thus, they were
not purposefully excluded. The disparate impact that the jury wheel
refilling procedure had on young adults did not satisfy the purposeful
and intentional exclusion requirement necessary to a prima facie
case.60
Hamling does not tell us much about the constitutionality ofjuries
on which young adults are significantly underrepresented today. First,
Hamling arose before the Twenty-Sixth Amendment6 l was ratified, and
the litigants did not argue that the amendment's prohibition of age
discrimination in voting had any bearing on jury service. 62 As I will
argue below, the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is a cru-
54 Id. at 136.
55 Id As noted above, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) provides for periodic but infrequent refill-
ing ofjuror wheels from voting lists. The version of § 1863 in effect at the time of Hamling
was identical in this respect. Because § 1863 ties juror eligibility to voter eligibility, and
because before 1970 voters in federal elections had to be at least 21 years old, failure to
refill a federal jury wheel for three years would have made all potential jurors at least 24 by
the time of refilling.
56 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 137. The court of appeals likewise had assumed without decid-
ing the cognizability of the age-based group. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
60 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 138.
61 See infra note 86, and part II.A.2.d, for a discussion of the text and history of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
62 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified inJuly 1971, two months after Mr. Ham-
ling was indicted and his criminal prosecution initiated. United States v. Hamling, 481
F.2d 307, 310 (9th Cir. 1973), afj'd, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Although Hamling's trial did not
begin until October 1971, there is no suggestion in either of the two Hamling appellate
opinions that he raised a Twenty-Sixth Amendment argument.
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cial part of the argument against the exclusion of age-based groups.63
Moreover, the prima facie requirement of purposeful exclusion on
which the Hamling Court relied has been watered down, if not aban-
doned, in the Sixth Amendment criminal context in which Hamling
arose.64 The most significant modem Sixth Amendment case from
the Court, Duren, makes clear that the prima facie requirement that a
group's exclusion be "systematic" requires no more than that the ex-
clusion be "inherent" in the jury selection process; 65 statistical evi-
dence of disparate impact need not reflect a discriminatory purpose
to be constitutionally problematic.66 As Justice Blackmun's opinion
for the Court in Duren explains, in contrast to traditional equal protec-
tion cases, where discriminatory intent is required,67 "in Sixth Amend-
ment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself
demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in a jury
chosen from a fair community cross section. The only remaining
question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringe-
ment."68 And there is little doubt that the kind of underrepresenta-
tion of which Hamling complained would be deemed systematic for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment's prima facie framework set out in
Duren.
The Court in Hamling did go on to discuss the need, as a practical
policy matter, for some "play" in the joints of an operating jury wheel
refilling system. 69 However, the amount of play allowed depends
upon whether a constitutionally significant interest is threatened. Be-
cause the Court in Hamling concluded that no protected interest was
at stake,70 its discussion of the policies behind infrequent filling meth-
63 See infra part II.
64 The Supreme Court in Hamlingwas far from clear about the provisions of the Con-
stitution under which the defendants challenged the jury makeup. Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion characterized the jury exclusion claim as "constitutional," 418 U.S. at 91, but
never went on to flesh out the constitutional theory pressed. Instead, he cited to a variety
of Supreme Court and lower court cases involving equal protection and Sixth Amendment
challenges. See 418 U.S. at 137-39 nn.21-22.
65 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
66 Id. at 368 n.26.
67 But see Ortiz, supra note 25, at 1120-26 (arguing that intent standard has been
watered down in equal protection jury cases, such as Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977), to the point where statistical disparity is enough to require governmental justifica-
tion). See also infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
68 Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26. Lower courts have construed Duren as overruling the
basis on which the defendants' claim was rejected in Hamling. See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772
F.2d 982, 986 n.5, vacated en banc, 772 F.2d 982, 996 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1050 (1986).
69 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 138-39.
70 As explained above, this determination was based on an understanding of Sixth
Amendment doctrine that no longer prevails, and perhaps on a failure to appreciate the
importance of preventing age discrimination injury service, which in turn can be appreci-
ated only after one sees the connections between jury service and voting, and the protec-
tion against age discrimination in voting embodied in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
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ods cannot be taken as an endorsement of the "justification" that
would trump the assertion of a constitutional right. All we are left
with, then, is Hamling's "assumption" that young adults are cognizable
for constitutional purposes.
71
Lower courts, by contrast, have extensively considered and have
almost uniformly rejected the cognizability of age-based groups. 72 In-
deed, no federal appellate court currently recognizes age-based
groups for jury exclusion purposes, although a few decisions have re-
manded for trial on the "factual issue" of cognizability. 73 The lower
courts have generally ignored a developing body of social science data
to support the idea that people of different ages think differently.
74
71 One commentator has obliquely suggested that the legality of exclusion of age-
based groups was resolved by the Court in Carter v.Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). See
Underwood, supra note 16, at 765 n.175. Carterwas a class action brought by black citizens
of Greene County, Alabama, against officials charged with the administration of the state's
jury selection laws. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were fully qualified to serve but
had never been summoned forjury service, and that defendants had effected a discrimina-
tory exclusion of blacks from the grand and petit juries in Greene County. The plaintiffs
sought, among other relief, a declaration that the Alabama statutes governing jury selec-
tion were unconstitutional on their face. The Supreme Court upheld .plaintiffs' claim of
racial discrimination, but declined to hold that the statutes were facially unconstitutional.
In doing so, the Court noted that not all exclusion of groups from juries is constitutionally
problematic: "The States remain free to confine the selection to citizens, to persons meet-
ing specified qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those possessing
good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character." 396 U.S. at 332.
This reference in Carter to age specifications does not resolve the question of
cognizability of young adults for many reasons. First, to say that some statutory age specifi-
cations might by permissible is not to say that all are; no one would quarrel with a law that
prohibited 13-year olds from serving on juries. Significantly, the Alabama statutes under
attack in Carter did not exclude any voter from jury eligibility on account of age. Id. at 323
n.2. It is true that the Court cited to statutes from other states, some of which excluded at
the time persons under 25 years of age from jury service, even though those persons were
presumably eligible to vote in elections. But these citations were not essential to the evalu-
ation of Alabama's statute. In any event, and most importantly, Carter and the statutes it
cites predate the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which, as I argue below, essen-
tially makes age an illegitimate criterion on which to exclude those over 18 from political
participation. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Hamling Court did not think Carter
resolved the constitutionality of age-based exclusion; indeed, the Hamling court did not
cite to Carter at all. Thus, when Hamling and Carter are read together, the extent to which
age groups are constitutionally protected against jury exclusion, and why, are open ques-
tions in the Supreme Court.
72 See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1050 (1986); Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Greer, 675
F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975 (1982); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d. 782 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 958 (1982); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d
686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); see also Zeigler, supra note 44, at 1068
(observing that the biggest problem for groups complaining of age-based group exclusion
has been cognizability).
73 See Willis v. Zant, 770 F.2d 1212, 1217 (lth Cir. 1983); Ciudadanos Unidos de San
Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 1980).




The courts similarly have ignored the disproportionate number of
young people processed by the criminal justice system when consider-
ing the issue of young adult jury service cognizability.75
The refusal to cognize young adult groups results from two per-
ceived slippery slope problems. The first is the general line-drawing
problem discussed in the Introduction of this Article: if groups de-
fined by age are cognizable, why are not all other groups cognizable?
As one leading case puts it, "if the age classification is adopted, surely
blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless
variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treatment.
These are not the groups that the court has traditionally sought to
protect from under-representation on jury venires."76
The second slippery slope problem goes to defining the contours
of age-based groups. This slope poses no problem for those challeng-
ing explicit exclusion on the basis of age; once age is considered an
illegitimate criterion on which to base juror eligibility, any purposeful
age discrimination would be problematic.77 But those, like Hamling,
who challenge a systematic but perhaps unintentional under-
representation of an age group must identify end points for the
group. If there are no principled means for identifying these end
points, we must "be prepared to let each complainant's attorney select
his own age group, based solely upon the age boundaries that suit his
purposes by showing the greatest statistical disparity, merely to gain
tactical advantage rather than to meet constitutional standards."178
Any rule defining the boundaries of a protected group would be "by
arbitrary fiat superimposed on intuition."79 Even those judges who
have argued in favor of cognizing young adult groups have expressed
concern over this second line-drawing problem, calling the "bounda-
ries of age groups... somewhat necessarily arbitrary. '80
These slippery slope problems81 have plagued courts because the
doctrine at present is not informed by a workable theory to identify
75 Clifford Krauss, No Crystal Ball Needed on Crime N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at A14 tbl.
(indicating that nearly 40% of arrests in American cities are of young people ages 15 to
24).
76 Barber, 772 F. 2d at 999.
77 Of course, an age floor still needs to be established. As noted above, no one could
tenably claim that a 13-year old may not properly be excluded from jury service on account
of age. This floor is established by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's reference to persons
over 18 years of age. See infra part II.B.
78 Barber, 772 F.2d at 999.
79 Id. at 998.
80 Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 987, vacated en banc 772 F.2d 982, 996 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
81 One response to the slippery slopes would be to ride them to the bottom, eliminat-
ing key persons and peremptories, leaving only random selection from recently refilled
juror wheels and challenges for cause based upon an individual juror's demonstrated in-
competence or bias. Such an approach would necessarily mean that exclusion of would-be
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protected groups. But the two slippery slopes disappear when we rec-
ognize jury service is analogous to other important rights of political
participation, especially voting. This recognition solves the first slip-
pery slope problem in the age cases because the Constitution specifi-
cally identifies age as one of the criteria on which the right to vote
may not be abridged. 82  The Fifteenth,83 Nineteenth,8 4 Twenty-
Fourth, 5 and Twenty-Sixth8 6 Amendments identify groups whose
political participation is essential to a real democracy and who thus
are cognizable for jury exclusion purposes.
The second slippery slope problem also is addressed by the Con-
stitution's provisions on political participation-specifically the age re-
quirements for federal elective office holding8 7 and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment's reference to persons at least eighteen years of age.
Taken as a whole, the Constitution itself sets up an age line that cre-
ates the relevant boundaries: persons over eighteen-years old can
vote; persons over twenty-five-years old can vote and run for the
House; persons over thirty-years old can vote and run for the House or
Senate; and persons over thirty-five can do all that and run for the
Presidency or Vice-Presidency.88 Thus, the Constitution's own age-de-
jurors based upon occupation, geography, education, intelligence, citizenship, residency,
and disability would not be permitted. The Supreme Court has suggested that most, if not
all, of these criteria may constitutionally be utilized. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
310, 332-33 (1970) (listing legitimate bases for exclusion); Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638
(1906) (upholding occupational exclusions). The approach adopted in this article solves
the slippery slope problems without necessarily calling into question all of these criteria,
and thus might preserve peremptories in a form that still can be useful. See Underwood,
supra note 16, at 768-74 (suggesting that peremptories are still valuable even if certain
criteria on which to base them are constitutionally removed).
82 See infra note 86.
83 The text of the Fifteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[tihe right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST
amend. XV, § 1.
84 The text of the Nineteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[t ] he right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
85 The text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he
right of the citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for Presi-
dent or Vice President, for Electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Rep-
resentative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State
by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
86 The text of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[tihe
right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of age." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (House members must be at least 25 years old.); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (Senators must be at least 30 years old.); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (Presi-
dent must be at least 35 years old.).
88 The Constitution requires that those running for the Vice-Presidency be eligible to
serve as President. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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fined groups include eighteen to twenty-five year olds, twenty-five to
thirty year olds, thirty to thirty-five year olds, and persons over thirty-
five. Accordingly, if any of these age groups is excluded8 9 from jury
service, then the Constitution is offended.
Of course, solutions to slippery slope problems need to be princi-
pled. The lines this Article proposes-unlike those that could be
drawn under an Equal Protection Clause never designed to apply to
political rights such as jury service-are rooted in the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution and case law interpreting it. With re-
spect to the first slippery slope, the connection between jury service
and voting goes back to the time of the framing, and continues to be
visible through the reconstruction and subsequent amendments in-
volving voting protection, as well as the Supreme Court decisions pro-
tecting groups from jury exclusion. As to the second slippery slope,
the constitutional age categories reflect constitutionally presumed dif-
ferences in attitudes and life perspectives, which in turn can affect the
"flavor" of a group's political participation.
II
JURY SERVICE AS A RIGHT OF POLrrICAL PARTICIPATION
A. The Voting Connection as a Means of Determining Which
Groups Count
The response to the first slippery slope problem-if age-based
groups, who else?-proceeds in three steps. First, the Framers recog-
nized the connection between jury service and other forms of political
participation, especially voting. Second, this connection between jury
service and voting as two components in a package of political rights
runs through the reconstruction and voting discrimination amend-
ments, from the Fifteenth, which proved to be the textual and intel-
lectual template for the others, through the Twenty-Sixth, which
prohibits age discrimination. And third, an appreciation of this con-
nection implicitly informs the line one can draw through the
Supreme Court case law identifying the groups that have been held to
be cognizable.
89 I use "excluded" here to refer only to systematic but not necessarily purposeful
underrepresentation that is notjustified by an important governmental interest See supra
notes 65-68 and accompanying text. As noted above, the second slippery slope problem to
which the constitutional age lines are responsive does not arise if age is explicitly the crite-




Constitutional history provides strong support for the Supreme
Court's recognition, in Powers90 and Edmonson,91 of the link between
jury service and other rights of political participation.9 2 Jury service
was understood at the time of the founding by leaders on all sides of
the ratification debate as one of the fundamental prerequisites to
majoritarian self-government. Indeed, one of the sharpest attacks
anti-federalists could make on the new Constitution was that it did not
go far enough in the protection of the institution of juries.9 3 The
federalists took this charge seriously and ultimately responded by,
among other things, enacting the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Amendments.
94
The Framers expected the jury to act as a mediating body to insu-
late individuals from government overreaching. Coming from a pool
of ordinary citizens and owing no financial allegiance to the govern-
ment, juries had the power to the thwart the excesses of powerful and
overly ambitious government officials. 95 Nowhere was this more true
than in criminal cases, where the grand jury could terminate any pros-
ecution it deemed "unfounded or malicious," and the petitjury could
interpose itself on behalf of the defendant if the executive sought to
trump up charges against a political critic.96
But the jury's function in the federal constitutional scheme was
not limited to the protection of individual litigants. Rather, the jury
was an essential democratic institution because it was a means by
which citizens could engage in self-government. As the anti-federalist
historian Herbert Storing has eloquently stated, "[t] he question was
not fundamentally whether the lack of adequate provision for jury
trial would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although
that was also involved) but whether it would fatally weaken the role of
the people in the administration of government."97 And in the words
90 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
91 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
92 Other commentators have observed this link but have not explored it. See, e.g.,
Underwood, supra note 16, at 765 n.171. My brother has unearthed much framing-period
evidence on the political nature ofjuries. See Akhil R. Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
93 See HERBERTJ. STORING, WHAT THE ANTi-FEDERAUSTS WERE FOR 19 (1981) (discuss-
ing the politics of the Constitution's opponents).
94 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 92, at 1182-90; Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendmen 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 668-69 (1973); Alan H. Scheiner,
Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of ju 2y
Power, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 142, 148 n.26 (1991).
95 Amar, supra note 92, at 1183.
96 Id. at 1185.
97 SToRING, supra note 93, at 19. See also Letters of Centinel (II), reprinted in 2 THE COM-
PL=E ANTI-FEDERALIST 143, 149 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981) (anti-federalist essayist argu-
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of the Federal Fanner on whose writings Storing draws, "[i] t is true,
the laws are made by the legislature; but the judges and juries, in their
interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very
extensive influence ... for changing the nature of the government."
98
The Federal Farmer grounded the importance of juries on their
application of law to fact, which necessarily involves shaping the law
itself:
It is [also] true, the freemen of a country are not always minutely
skilled in the laws, but they have common sense in its purity, which
seldom or never errs in making and applying laws to the condition
of the people, or in determining judicial causes, when stated to
them by the parties. The body of the people, principally, bear the
burdens of the community; they of right ought to have a controul in
its important concerns, both in making and executing the laws,
otherwise they may, in a short time, be ruined.99
We find corroboration of this public law function in the discus-
sion of criminal cases, in which juries have traditionally been thought
of primarily as important guarantors of individual rights. The grand
jury, in particular, was intended to operate as an organ for democratic
self-government. In the words of James Wilson:
The grand jury are a great channel of communication, between
those who make and administer the laws, and those for whom the
laws are made and administered. All the operations of government,
and of its ministers and officers, are within the compass of their view
and research. They may suggest publick improvements, and the
modes of removing publick inconveniences: they may expose to
publick inspection, or to publick punishment, publick bad men,
and publick bad measures.100
Once we see the important way in which juries provide avenues
for political participation, the connections people of the time drew
between jury service and other means of political participation, in par-
ing that jury trials preserve "in the hands of the people, that share which they ought to
have in the administration of justice"); Amar, supra note 92, at 1187 n.250.
98 Letter from the Federal Farmer (XI9, repinted in 2 THE COMPLErE AiTI-FEDERALiST,
supra note 97, at 315, 315.
99 Id. at 320; see also Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Trial by ajury of laymen rather than by the sovereign's judges
was important to the founders because juries represent the layman's common sense, the
'passional elements in our nature,' and thus keep the administration of law in accord with
the wishes and feelings of the community.") (citing OLrvER W. HoLMEs, COLLECTED LE.AL
PAPERS 237 (1920)).
100 2 THE WoiuS oFJAMs WiLsoN 537 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). The adminis-
tration of law and the protection of individual rights converge on the question of petitjury
constitutional review (i.e., ajury's ability and duty to review the constitutionality of a law it
is being asked to apply). Advocates of such a review believed juries are no different than
judges in this regard, so thatjuries must follow their own vision of the Constitution. For a
discussion of this issue, see Amar, supra note 92, at 1191-95.
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ticular voting, make more sense. Alexis de Tocqueville, whom the
Court has quoted extensively in recent jury exclusion cases,101 keenly
understood these linkages. Commenting on the overall jury system,
he wrote:
[The jury] puts the real control of affairs into the hands of the
ruled .... rather than into those of the rulers.
... The jury system as understood in America seems to me as
direct and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty
of the people as universal suffrage. They are both equally powerful
means of making the majority prevail.
•... [T]he jury is above all a political institution ... [and]
should be made to harmonize with the other laws establishing that
sovereignty.... [F] or society to be governed in a settled and uni-
form manner, it is essential that the jury lists should expand or
shrink with the lists of voters.
10 2
Tocqueville later added, albeit with some qualification, that "[i]n
America all citizens who are electors have the right to be jurors." 0 3
The Framers likened the role of the people in making up juries
to the role of voters selecting legislative bodies; references to legisla-
tive bodies abounded during the debates over the Constitution's jury
provisions. Observed the Federal Farmer:
It is essential in every free country, that common people should
have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the
legislative department.
The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection
of the people by their representatives in the legislature . . . have
procured for them, in this country, their true proportion of influ-
ence, and the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in
the community.'0
4
Another anti-federalist essayist went even further, indicating that
as between electoral voting and jury service, a democracy free from
corrupt antimajoritarian government depended more on the latter:
The trial by jury is... more necessary than representatives in the
legislature; for those usurpations, which silently undermine the
spirit of liberty, under the sanction of law, are more dangerous than
101 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991).
102 TOCQUEWLLE, supra note 16, at 250-51.
103 Id. app. I at 702 (observing general rule and sole exception of New York).
104 Letters From the Federal Farmer (IV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 97, at 245, 249-50; see also TocQuEVILLE, supra note 16, at 251 ("The jury is the
part of the nation responsible for the execution of the laws, as the legislative assemblies are
the part with the duty of making them .... ").
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direct and open legislative attacks; in the one case the treason is
never discovered until liberty, and with it the power of defence is
lost; the other is an open summons to arms, and then if the people
will not defend their rights, they do not deserve to enjoy them.
0 5
Finally, the relationship between jury service and other modes of
political participation crops up in discussions of the educational qual-
ity ofjuries. As one commentator has succinctly put it, "[t]hrough the
jury, Citizens would learn self-government by doing self-govern-
ment." 0 6 This learning, of course, would carry over to other political
activity. As Tocqueville explained:
Juries, especially civiljuries, instill some of the habits of the judicial
mind into every citizen, and just those habits are the very best way of
preparing people to be free.
... [T] hey make all men feel that they have duties toward soci-
ety and that they take a share in its government. By making men
pay more attention to things other than their own affairs, they com-
bat that individual selfishness which is like rust in society.
• . . [The jury] should be regarded as a free school which is
always open and in which each juror learns his rights.... and is
given practical lessons in the law .... I think that the main reason
for the ... political good sense of the Americans is their long expe-
rience with juries in civil cases.
1 0 7
Making clear his distinction between actual self-government
through juries and the development of self-governance skills from jury
service that were transferable to other modes of democratic govern-
ment, such as voting and office holding, Tocqueville concluded that
"[t]he jury is both the most effective way of establishing the people's
rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule."10 In
light of these virtues of the jury system, Tocqueville was not at all sur-
prised to find, as a general and theoretical matter, that "[e]very Amer-
ican citizen can vote or be voted for and may be a juror."10 9
105 Essays by a Farmer (v9, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETEAI-FEDERAmST, supra note 97,
at 36, 88 (emphasis omitted). Thomas Jefferson echoed this point when he declared in
1789 that "it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government...
[but w]ere I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted from the
Legislative orJudiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legisla-
tive." Letter from ThomasJefferson to Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1959).
106 Amar, supra note 92, at 1187.
107 TocuEvnLLE, supra note 16, at 252-53.
108 Id. at 254.
109 Id. at 251.
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2. Voting Discrimination Amendments
a. The Fifteenth Amendment
Analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment begins, for present pur-
poses, by asking why the Fifteenth Amendment was necessary. In
other words, why was not discrimination on the basis of race in voting
already proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment? 110 One simple re-
sponse is that given by the second Justice Harlan in Oregon v. Mitch-
eli:"' that the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment is itself
"evidence that [those responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment]
did not understand it to accomplish such a result."112 Most modem
110 One might also argue that racially motivated denial of voting amounts to a badge
of servitude and thus violates the Thirteenth Amendment. This argument would be diffi-
cult to maintain, however, in light of the fact that free blacks in Northern States did not
have the right to vote as a matter of course until the Fifteenth Amendment was enacted.
But cf. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: The Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibi-
tion Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CoRNEn- L. Rnv. 1 (1990).
111 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
112 Id. at 166 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874) (observing that perceived need for Fifteenth Amend-
ment undermines claim that voting is a privilege or immunity protected by the Four-
teenth). Justice Harlan's position in Mitchell that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
confer upon Congress the power to prescribe voting qualifications, did not rest upon the
enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment alone. Justice Harlan also pointed to Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which gives Congress the power to decrease a State's
representation in Congress if it denies the suffrage to any male citizens twenty-one years or
older on grounds other than commission of a crime. Justice Harlan believed enactment of
this provision left States free to prescribe voting qualifications, subject to the potential
consequences. Mitchell 400 U.S at 152, 168-69 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). One response to this suggestion would be that Section Two merely provides
an extraordinary remedy for something that Section One-which contains the Privileges
and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses-already prohibits states from
doing and which Congress can also punish through more conventional means under its
Section Five enforcement powers. But if Section One prohibits States from setting certain
voter qualifications, why does Section Two not merely refer back to Section One violations
instead of fleshing out the circumstances under which Congress can reduce a State's repre-
sentation? Moreover, and in any event, argued Harlan, the historical evidence concerning
the meaning of the clauses in Section One foreclosed any argument that this Section af-
fected States' authority to regulate the franchise. Id. at 152-200.
Justice Brennan, writing as well forJustices Marshall and White in Mitchell took issue
with Justice Harlan's historical survey. 400 U.S. at 250-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). As at least one commentator has pointed out, see John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 YALE LJ. 1385, 1440 n.225 (1992), all
of the (limited) historical evidence Justice Brennan adduces that relates anything in the
Fourteenth Amendment to suffrage concerns only the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The relevance of that clause to voting is addressed infra at notes 114-29 and accompanying
text. In light of the well-settled meaning of privileges and immunities of citizenship and
the disavowal by Section One's drafters that anything in that section affected voting, Bren-
nan clearly seems to have the weaker of the historical debate. In any event, the argument
Justice Brennan makes-on the Privileges and Immunities Clause-was itself rejected by
the Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), which is explored below. Instead,
the Court has apparently embraced the notion that the Equal Protection Clause applies to
voting, a proposition for which Brennan cites no historical support and which is difficult to
square with the broad text of that clause. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
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cases and commentators, however, appear to suggest that the Four-
teenth Amendment does address voting discrimination, even though
this reading renders the Fifteenth Amendment essentially
superfluous.11
3
Within the Fourteenth Amendment, the two likeliest candidates
to proscribe voting discrimination are the Privileges and Immunities
and Equal Protection Clauses.'1 4 But there are major problems with
both. The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prohibit race
discrimination in the franchise because voting was not among the
"privileges or immunities [of citizenship]" as that phrase was used in
Article IV of the Constitution or elsewhere in legal discourse. For ex-
ample, a citizen of Massachusetts visiting South Carolina would be en-
titled to many "civil" privileges and immunities, such as the right to
own property, but would not be entitled to vote in South Carolina
elections or exercise any other "political" rights. Thus, a key distinc-
tion drawn by the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866115 and the
closely related Fourteenth Amendment" 6 was that between civil and
political rights; only the former were intended to be safeguarded."
7
113 See, e.g., Mitchelt 400 U.S. at 251-52 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Ortiz, supra note 25.
114 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
116 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which survived PresidentJohnson's veto, is one of the
important intellectual forerunners of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus provides rele-
vant historical information for those who seek to understand the concerns and ambitions
of the amendment's framers. For a discussion of the important relationship between the
two, see Akhil R Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Four*enth Amendment 101 YALE L. J. 1193,
1244-46 (1992); see also Mitchel; 400 U.S. at 162-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (observing that one of the primary goals of Fourteenth Amendment was
to "constitutionalize the Act" and that the "privileges and immunities" in Section One of
Fourteenth Amendment "include those set out in the ... Act").
117 Harrison, supra note 112, at 1417. Section One of the 1866 Act listed as civil rights
the following private law rights: (1) to make and enforce contracts; (2) to sue, and be sued;
(3) to give evidence; (4) to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold and convey real and personal
property; and (5) to enjoy equal protection of the laws. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
StAt. 27. To say, as does Harrison, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause essentially
constitutionalized this list is not to deny that it also "incorporated" against the states other
"privileges and immunities" of citizenship found within the Bill of Rights and the rest of
the Constitution. SeeAmar, supra note 116. As noted above, the jury was a central political
institution in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. Thus, one could argue that in-
corporation of the jury trial amendments means that certain kinds of discrimination in
juries is problematic. But the Bill of Rights jury amendments, without more, do not tell us
anything about who has a right to participate on juries-that is, which groups must be
included for a body to be a "jury." Thus, we still need an answer for the question, which
groups count and why? The answer proposed by this Article invokes the voting discrimina-
tion amendments because of the link between voting and jury service as part of a package
of political participation rights recognized in the voting discrimination amendments.
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Senator Stephen Douglas explained the civil-political distinction
when he remarked on the floor of Congress in 1850 that free blacks in
Illinois were "protected in the enjoyment of all their civil rights," but
were "not permitted to serve on juries, or in the militia, or to vote at
elections; or to exercise any other political rights."" 8 Douglas's dis-
tinction resurfaced many times during the debate on the 1866 Act.
Representative Russell Thayer, for instance, invoked the distinction in
order to allay fears that statutory language prohibiting discrimination
in "civil rights and immunities" might apply to voting. Representative
Thayer assured his colleagues:
The words themselves are 'civil rights and immunities,' not political
privileges; and nobody can successfully contend that a bill guaran-
teeing simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under which you
could extend the right of suffrage, which is a political privilege and
not a civil right.119
Representative Wilson of Iowa made a similar observation. In dis-
cussing the proposed Act's "civil rights and immunities" language,
Wilson promised colleagues that the legislation would not affect the
quintessential political rights of voting and jury service:
What do these terms [of the Act] mean? Do they mean that in all
things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race
or color shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed. Do
they mean that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No; for
suffrage is a political right which has been left under the control of
the several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it
becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican form of
118 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., Ist Sess. 1664 (1850). Antebellum cases corroborate this
usage. See, e.g., Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 559 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23
Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827) (asserting that voting is not a privilege or immunity of citizen-
ship); but cf Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Gas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(Washington,J., riding circuit). Professor Harrison has characterized Justice Washington's
dicta in Coryell that voting is a "privilege" of citizenship as a minority view. Harrison, supra
note 112, at 1417. I would add that it is also an ambiguous view. After enumerating vari-
ous private law protections as a list of privileges, Washington concluded with the phrase,
"to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by... the State in
which it is to be exercised" Coryel, 6 F. Gas. at 552 (emphasis added). In any event, the
suggestion that voting is a privilege or immunity of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment was rejected by the Supreme Court as a whole in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
162 (1874), discussed infra at notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
119 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Thayer); see also
id. at 476, 599, 606, 1151, 1159, 1757, 1836, 3035 (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Reps.
Russell Thayer and William Windom, and Sen.John Henderson) (Civil Rights Bill does not
encompass political rights). In the end, the Act as finally adopted did not include a gen-
eral ban on discrimination in civil rights or immunities, in "an abundance of caution" for
those who feared "it might be held by courts that the right of suffrage was included." Id. at
1366-67 (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
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government. Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on ju-
ries..... These are not civil rights or immunities.
120
Representative Lawrence, addressing the same question, echoed
Wilson's sentiments, again discussing voting and jury service, along
with office holding, as a grouping of political rights unaffected by the
legislation. In Lawrence's words, the Act speaks only to civil privileges
and "does not affect any political right, as that of suffrage, the right to
sit on juries, hold office, etc."121
This important distinction drawn repeatedly during considera-
tion of the Act carried over to, and informed interpretation of, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was intended to preserve the political-civil line. 22 As Professor
Harrison has put it, however "close [the] connection between [the
Fourteenth Amendment's] privileges and immunities [of citizenship
language] and [the concept of] civil rights[,] neither was thought to
extend to political rights, such as voting or serving on juries."23
This interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
confirmed after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in Minor v.
Happersett.'24 In Minor, the Court considered the claim that "a
woman, born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the State in which she resides, [and
thus] has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities
of her citizenship, which the State cannot by its laws or Constitution
abridge."'2 5 The Court readily agreed with the first part of the argu-
ment-that women may be citizens of the United States so as to be
entitled to the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 26
But the unanimous Court went on to reject the plaintiff's claim, hold-
ing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not add to the privi-
leges and immunities that existed before it was enacted. Because
suffrage was not coextensive with citizenship at the time the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, 2 7 the Court reasoned, voting was
not among the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Amend-
120 Id. at 1117 (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
121 Id. at 1832 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence).
122 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUGION, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7, 12, 15 (1866) (distinguishing between "civil" and "political" rights, and linking
Section One of proposed Fourteenth Amendment with "civil rights and privileges"); see also
supra notes 116-17, infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
123 Harrison, supra note 112, at 1417.
124 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
125 Ird. at 165.
126 Id. at 168-69.
127 Id. at 171-78; see also H.R. REp. No. 22, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-3 (1871) (report by
Congressman John Bingham concluding that Fourteenth Amendment had not added to
the privileges and immunities of Article IV and that the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tees thus did not include voting).
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ment. Thus, a provision in a State Constitution that confined the
right to vote to "male citizens of the United States"1 28 did not run
afoul of the privileges and immunities clause; "in such a state women
[simply had] .. .no right to vote."
1 29
The Equal Protection Clause also was not understood at the time
of its enactment as requiring race neutrality in voting. Fourteenth
Amendment co-author Representative John Bingham, in language
that addresses both the equal protection and privileges and immuni-
ties arguments examined here, said that "[t]he [proposed] amend-
ment [as a whole] does not give, as the second section shows, the
power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States." 30 Sen-
atorJacob Howard was even more to the point. When he introduced
the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, he reassured his fellow leg-
islators that "the first section [which includes the Equal Protection
Clause as well as the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process
Clauses] of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these
classes [blacks or whites] the right of voting."
1 31
The broad phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause confirms this
understanding. Unlike the Privilege and Immunities Clause but like
the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause applies to all per-
sons, not just citizens. The drafters of Section One clearly wanted the
Fourteenth Amendment to afford some protection to non-citizens, in-
cluding aliens, and needed a separate provision because of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause's limited application to citizens. As
Representative Bingham remarked on the floor of the House:
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
[of the United States]? Is it not [also] essential ... that all persons,
whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal pro-
tection in every State in the Union... ?132
Senator Howard's explanation to the Senate was to the same effect:
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses "disable[d] a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any per-
son, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
128 Minor, 88 U.S. at 163 (syllabus).
129 Id.; see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 366 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting) (jury
service not protected by Privileges and Immunities Clause).
130 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham); see
also supra note 112 (discussing impact of Section Two on voting question).
131 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard). See also
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 122; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 163 (1956) (quoting 1866 campaign speech of Senator Thad-
deus Stevens conceding that Section One of Fourteenth Amendment "does not touch...
political rights").
132 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
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cess of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of
the State." 3
3
If the drafters intended the Equal Protection Clause to apply to
aliens, then freedom from voting discrimination could not have been
thought to be a denial of equal protection. For it is clear that the
Constitution did not prohibit states from denying to aliens the right to
vote and exercise other political participatory rights on the basis of
their alienage. Thus, like the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause could not have been meant to apply to voting
and other rights of political participation.
Once we see the void in the protection of political rights-such as
voting,jury service, and office holding-left by enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment, we can examine the Fifteenth Amendment's path
to passage more meaningfully. One early distillation of what later be-
came the Fifteenth Amendment made clear its intent to fill that void,
by providing that "all provisions in the Constitution or laws of any
State whereby any distinction is made in political or civil rights or privi-
leges on account of race... or color shall be inoperative and void." a34
The draft went on to give "Congress [the] power to make all laws nec-
essary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in every
State the same political rights and privileges."'35 Consistent with their
focus on political participation, proponents of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment also advocated at times a broad package of rights of political
participation that could not be abridged on a variety of grounds. For
example, Senator Henry Wilson, commenting on circulating drafts
that protected voting and office holding from racial discrimination
only, wanted to go further and prohibit discrimination "in the elective
franchise or the right to hold office on account of race, color, nativity,
property, education, or creed." 36
133 Id. at 2766; see also id. at 505, 1115, 2560, 2768-69, 2890 (remarks of Sen. Johnson,
Rep. Wilson, Sens. Stewart, Wade and Cowan) (drawing person-citizen distinction); Amar,
supra note 116, at 1193, 1224-1228 & n.145.
134 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1032 (1869) (Sen. Fessenden) (emphasis
added).
135 Id. (emphasis added). Fessenden was quoting, in the midst of the Fifteenth
Amendment debate, a proposed amendment he had drafted and submitted to the Senate
three years earlier-while the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated-concerning, to
use Fessenden's words in 1869, the "proposition now under consideration," id. As one
commentator put it, "the Fessenden plan ... involved the idea which finally took definite
shape [not in the Fourteenth but] in the Fifteenth Amendment." JOHN M. MATHEwS, LEG-
ISLATIrE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFrEENTI AMENDMENT 12 (1909). The Fessenden
plan's goals were echoed by abolitionist Wendell Phillips in his call for an amendment
"forbidding disenfranchisement, or proscription from official trust, on account of race or color,
in any State or Territory of the Union." Id. at 20 (citing Anti Slavety Standard, Nov. 7, 1868)
(emphasis added).
136 See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: PoLrxcs AND THE PASSAGE OF THE Ff-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 59 (1965); ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 56 (1978) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1300 (1869)). In the
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The question of whether office holding, in particular, ought to be
included in the text of the amendment is worthy of discussion. Each
house of the 40th Congress passed a proposed amendment that would
have expressly prohibited not only racially discriminatory voter qualifi-
cations but discriminatory qualifications for office as well.' 3 7 A Con-
ference Committee, consisting of Senators Stewart, Conkling, and
Edmunds, and Representatives Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan, struck
out the office-holding provision.'38 With Inauguration Day and its
ushering in of a new Congress-and one that was not nearly so radi-
cally Republican-only a week away, both Houses accepted the Con-
ference report version and passed it on to the states.'
3 9
Although the Conference Committee did not explain its deletion
of the office-holding provision, a plausible explanation is not hard to
construct. To begin with, many persons thought that the right to be
free from discrimination in voting implied the right to be free from
discrimination in office holding. Congressman Butler of Massachu-
setts articulated most forcefully the argument that the political right
to vote presumptively carries with it the similarly political right to
serve in office:
I had supposed if there was anything which was inherent as a princi-
ple in the American system and theory of government, of equality of
all men before the law, and the right of all men to a share in the
Government, it was this: that the right to elect to office carries with
it the inalienable and indissoluble and indefeasible right to be
elected to office. 140
end, the drafters' special concern with race is reflected in the limited language sent to the
States. The special concern for race is also reflected in other early drafts of the amend-
ment. There, devices such as poll taxes and literacy tests, which had been used in the
South to dilute the effect of race-neutral voting provisions Southern states were required to
build into their constitutions as conditions for readmittance to the union, were proscribed.
See id. at 57. These efforts were not successful until passage of the Twenty-Fourth amend-
ment and the Supreme Court's decision in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), discussed infra part II.A.3.
137 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 166 (1970) (Harlan,J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
138 See, e.g., GiLLETT, supra note 136, at 70-71.
139 There was widespread belief that if the version of the Fifteenth Amendment re-
ported from the joint conference committee were not approved, the amendment process
itself might have died. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess 1627 (1869) (remarks of
Sens. Wilson, Morton); see also GRIMES, supra note 136, at 58; MATHrws, supra note 135, at
34. This belief was in large part driven by the fact that the new 41st Congress, while still
Republican enough to enact progressive legislation, would not easily provide the two-thirds
majority in each chamber required under Article V's constitutional amendment process.
140 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1426 (1869) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
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Importantly, at least half of the Conference Committee which ulti-
mately recommended the deletion of the office-holding provision ex-
pressed agreement with this sentiment. 41
Even if the right to vote free from racial discrimination logically
subsumed other rights of political participation, including the right to
run for and hold office free from the same discrimination, one must
still ask why the drafters would not make the office-holding protection
explicit. In other words, what would be the harm of including office-
holding language in the amendment, from the perspective of those
who thought such language unnecessary?1 42 The answer may be that
inclusion of an office-holding provision would have implied that vot-
ing by itself does not subsume office holding. This in turn would have
141 See id. at 1425-26 (Rep. Boutwell) (observing that holding office is a "legal conse-
quence[ I and right[ I" of the House version of the Amendment although it speaks ex-
pressly only to voting); GnLu'rr, supra note 136, at 71 (noting that Senators Stewart and
Conkling "agreed [to leave out a reference to office holding from the Conference Commit-
tee version of the proposed amendment) because they felt the right to vote included the
right to hold office"); WILIAM M. STEWART, REMINISCENCES OF SENATOR WILIAM M. STEw-
ART OF NEVADA 236 (1908) (observing that as Senator he "was willing to strike out [the
office-holding language] ... because I thought the right to vote carried with it the right to
hold office" and that "Mr. Conkling agreed with me"). Senator Stewart's position on this
issue appears to have evolved somewhat by the time he served on the Conference Commit-
tee on February 24, 1869; in earlier floor statements he expressed his desire for explicit
office-holding language in the amendment. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
1292 (statement on Feb. 17, 1869). It is noteworthy that most of these earlier floor state-
ments predate Congressman Butler's forceful plea of February 20, 1869, quoted above, and
Butler's accompanying observations about the political implications of an explicit refer-
ence to office holding in the amendment, see discussion infra notes 142-56 and accompany-
ing text. But see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1629 (Feb. 26, 1869) (exchange
between Sens. Stewart and Sawyer) (In this exchange, Senator Sawyer anticipated and re-
jected Senator Stewart's argument that voting includes office holding. Senator Stewart
responded not by reasserting his belief that voting does presumptively include office hold-
ing, but rather by observing that he had wanted to insert the right to hold office into the
amendment. Stewart added that in any event the omission of office-holding language
would have little practical effect because, whether or not voting legally subsumed office
holding, black voters would have the political clout to demand the right to hold office.)
Others legislators expressed, although sometimes with less rhetorical flair than Con-
gressman Butler, similar beliefs that the right to hold office was logically subsumed within
the constitutional right to vote. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1625 (1869)
(remarks of Sen. Howard); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 168 n.19 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that "the idea that the
right to vote without more implies the right to be voted for was specifically referred to by
supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment in both Houses of Congress"); infra note 178 (dis-
cussing cases in which the Court has accepted this "idea").
Not everyone in Congress agreed, of course, that voting subsumed office holding,
even after Butler's eloquent statement. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., app. at 92
(1869) (remarks of Rep. Miller); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1629 (1869) (remarks
of Sen. Sawyer); id. at 1627 (remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 1632 (remarks of Sen. Hen-
dricks); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong:, 2d Sess. 2676 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
142 Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1629 (1869) (Sen. Sawyer posing the ques-




had implications for a reconstruction controversy that was still un-
resolved at the time the Fifteenth Amendment was drafted.
The federal act by which Georgia had been offered readmission
to the Union after the Civil War required by its terms a promise from
Georgia that freedom from racial discrimination in suffrage always re-
main part of its fundamental law, the State Constitution. 43 In July of
1868 Georgia amended its constitution and submitted it to Congress
for approval.'4 This new Georgia constitution, approved by Con-
gress, complied with Congress' suffrage condition but was silent as to
black office holding. Georgia was tentatively readmitted in the sum-
mer of 1868.145 Then, in the fall of 1868, Georgia expelled all its
newly elected black state legislators. As a result of this expulsion,
Georgia's reconstruction was reopened. In early 1869, at the same
time it was drafting the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress was in the
process of deciding how to respond to Georgia's actions and did not,
in choosing language for the Fifteenth Amendment, want to suggest
that Georgia's conduct might not have violated Congress' reconstruc-
tion directives. Again, Congressman Butler's words are enlightening:
I am myself almost persuaded not to vote for the amendment [the
current form of which contained an office-holding provision]. As it
comes to us from the Senate it provides that no man, on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be deprived of
the right to hold office.... [I]f we adopt this provision without a
word of protest, the effect will be by intendment to legalize that
which has been done in Georgia in voting the colored men out of
office. If it takes a [specific] constitutional provision to prevent a
man from being deprived of holding office because of race or color
[when that man is already protected by a federally approved state
constitutional provision with respect to voting], then the men of the
Legislature of Georgia did right. ... I [therefore] wish to vote for
an effectual provision that will leave beyond doubt the right to vote,
and stop there, because there came with it the right to be voted for
bey6nd all question.146
In other words, Representative Butler suggested, if Congress were
to object to Georgia's expulsion of black office holders on the ground
143 Act ofJune 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (1868). Although the Act did not refer to
race as such but rather required that Georgia's constitution shall never "be so amended or
changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States the right to vote
in said State, who are entitled to vote by the constitution [of Georgia] herein recognized,
except as punishment for... crimes," its goal-recognized at the time of the Act's adop-
tion and since-was the protection of black voters. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess., app. at 275 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Morton); JoHN H. FRAaNxN, RECONsTRUCION:
AFrER THE CVIL WAR 130 (1961).
144 See CONG GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1702 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Butier).
145 Id.
146 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1426 (1869) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
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that such expulsion violated Congress' understanding of the Georgia
constitution it had approved, then the voting provisions of Georgia's
constitution must have included office holding as well. And if this
were the rule of state constitutional construction, ought not it to in-
form the drafting of federal constitutional amendments?
In this regard, Representative Butler echoed the reasoning of a
Senate Judiciary Committee report on the Georgia matter that Sena-
tor Stewart had authored a month earlier. 147 In explaining its recom-
mendation not to seat senators from Georgia, that report observed
that Georgia's new constitution was understood by the Congress that
approved it as protecting black office holding:
Your committee are of [the] opinion that under the constitution of
Georgia there is no distinction in the right to hold office on ac-
count of race or color, and they are quite confident that such was
the opinion of Congress at the time it approved that constitution. 148
While Congress was deciding how to respond to the situation in
Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that Georgia's constitu-
tion protected the rights of blacks to hold office, notwithstanding the
absence of explicit office-holding language.1 49 But rather than wait
for the Georgia courts to execute their own judgments, Congress
reimposed military rule on Georgia.' 50 Among the conditions Geor-
gia would be required to meet before (its second) readmission was its
ratification of the proposed Fifteenth Amendment.' 5 '
147 S. REP. No. 192, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1869).
148 Id. Senator Trumbull later questioned whether all of the reasoning of the commit-
tee report enjoyed majority committee support. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
1925 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). But Trumbull's quarrel with the report had to
do not with the report's conclusion that Georgia's expulsion of black office holders was
contrary to Congress' understanding of Georgia's newly approved constitution, but rather
the report's independent conclusion that some other Georgia senators were ineligible for
public service under the fourteenth amendment because they had been rebels. Id. at 1925-
26. Indeed, there appears to be general agreement that Georgia's expulsion of black office
holders was one of the reasons the whole of Congress reimposed military rule and addi-
tional conditions for readmission. See id. at 1926; GRiMEs, supra note 136, at 55.
149 White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232 (1869).
150 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1703 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
151 Another provision of the Reorganization Act declared:
The expulsion of any person or persons elected.., from participation in
the proceedings of [the] senate or house of representatives upon the
ground of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, would be illegal
and revolutionary, and is hereby prohibited.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1703 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Butler).Enactment of this section by the 41st (less Republican) Congress apparently suggests
congressional acceptance of the position that even though constitutional protection of vot-
ing subsumes protection of office holding (and thus provides a federal basis for reimpos-
ing military rule upon Georgia), see supra notes 147-48, infra notes 152-55 and
accompanying text, there is little harm done by explicitly reminding Georgia in a federal
statute that it may not do again what it already did. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
2717-18 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Pool taking this position); see also infra note 156 (discuss-
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The justification relied on most often by Republicans in Congress
for imposing new rule and conditions upon Georgia was that sug-
gested by the Senate Judiciary Committee-Georgia's failure to abide
by Congress' understanding of the Georgia constitution it approved.
Indeed, as many Congressmen pointed out, Georgia could not legiti-
mately be punished by federal authorities for doing no more than vio-
lating its own state constitution; Congress had to premise its actions
on a federal breach.' 52 Responding to arguments that Georgia had
committed no federal breach, and the related suggestion that Georgia
was not given adequate notice of what Congress expected of her,15 3
Senator Howard thundered:
[I]f an excuse were wanting for the imposition of this further condi-
tion in the admission of Georgia, I feel for one that it is found in the
conduct of the dominant party in Georgia. They have not kept
their faith with the reconstruction acts. The reconstruction acts au-
thorize every male person twenty-one years of age, without distinc-
tion of color, to vote at the polls and to vote for members of the
Legislature, and to be voted for as members of the Legislature. The
right to be elected to the Legislature was as plainly provided for in
the reconstruction acts as was the right to vote. It was plainly writ-
ten on the face of the statute, so plainly that he who runs might
read, and that even he who stumbles might not mistake it. But
notwithstanding the clearness of that provision in those acts, when
the Legislature of Georgia assembled, there being a majority.., to
expel from the legislative bodies of that State .... a large portion of
the members elected; not because they were not twenty-one years
old, not because they were not citizens of the United States, not
because they had been guilty of any crime or offense ... . but be-
cause they were colored ....
Sir, there was no excuse or apology for this high-handed, revo-
lutionary, and oppressive measure. It was setting at direct defiance
the commands... of Congress. It was not keeping faith with the
United States. It was directly breaking faith with us.
15 4
In a similar vein are the words of Representative Coburn:
ing difference between statutory and constitutional office holding language). This posi-
tion also explains why the 41st Congress, in admitting Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas,
required each state, to promise not to discriminate "on account of ... race, color, br
previous condition of servitude, [in] the right to hold office under the constitution and
laws of said State," in addition to its promise to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. Act bf
Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68
(Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas). It is noteworthy thit
these readmission provisions dealing with office holding track the language of the'Fif-
teenth Amendment perfectly.
152 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., app. at 295 (1870) (remarks of Sen.
Fowler); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1869) (remarks of Rep. Beck).
153 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1869) (remarks of Sen. Bayar,).
154 Id. at 174 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
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But it is urged that Georgia having complied with the reconstruc-
tion acts, and having been admitted to representation in Congress,
cannot now be dealt with in the manner proposed. Now, the acts of
reconstruction were not intended as a vain and empty ceremony,
but were provided for the restoration of peace and security in the
region to which they applied; they were made in good faith, and it
was expected and understood that they should be complied with in
good faith. By them the freedmen were enfranchised and suffrage
and the right to hold office clearly conferred; yet, notwithstanding
this, the Legislature of Georgia deprived them of the right to hold
office, and expelled them from that body.... They have broken
faith as soon as admitted to the representation here .... 1 55
Given that Congress, in punishing Georgia, construed the Geor-
gia constitutional voting provisions to include office holding, it is not
at all surprising that, in drafting its own constitutional language, Con-
gress may not have wanted to suggest a need for explicit office-hold-
ing language.
56
155 Id. at 261 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). See also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
2717 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Pool) ("Whether or not under the guarantee clause [of the
federal constitution] it was proper for Congress to [punish Georgia for her expulsion of
black officeholders], Congress assumed that Georgia could not be admitted under its re-
construction policy-which policy it based on the high ground of necessity for the peace
and safety of this Union-unless colored men could have the right to hold office in the
State."); id. at 1951 (remarks of Sen. Stewart) (Georgia's actions made clear its "defiance of
the authority of the [federal] government."); id. at 1703 (remarks of Rep. Butler) (By
expelling black office holders Georgia "had already done ... the very things we declared
would be invalid."); id. at 2677 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("The judiciary committee of
the Senate and [the entire] Congress have decided that the expulsion of the colored men
from their seats was illegal and revolutionary."). But see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.,
app. at 288 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) ("[S]o far as the reconstruction acts go, it
was perfectly competent for the people of Georgia to exclude colored men from office.").
156 As noted earlier, the 41st Congress did not feel the need to remove office-holding
language from its reconstruction statutes. See, e.g., supra note 151. This distinction between
constitutional and statutory language is not surprising, given the prevailing attitude that
constitutions, unlike statutes, were not intended to be prolix. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This distinction might also explain why Congress, in
providing for political rights of blacks in the District of Columbia, proceeded in two stat-
.utes, the first providing for voting and the second providing for office holding and jury
service. Even here, however, it is not clear that office holding and jury service would not
have necessarily and logically followed from enactment of the voting statute alone. Sena-
tor Pomeroy suggested that the second proposed statute was designed to remedy a "defect"
in ,the first to the extent that the first bill purported to create a voting class ineligible for
"9ffice holding. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Pome-
roy). As Pomeroy noted, "there is no state in the union where a man has a right to be an
plector, where he has a right to vote, where he cannot be voted for." Id. One year earlier,
CQngressman Miller purported to identify an exception to this general rule in the State of
New York. Miller suggested, albeit cryptically, that New York's constitution permits blacks
to vote, but not to hold office or serve on juries. CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 305
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Miller). If Miller's observation rested on NewYork's constitution,
Pe was mistaken. Although the state constitution required blacks but not whites to own a
"geat deal of property in order to vote, nothing in it prevented blacks who qualified to vote
from holding any office. See Naw YoRK CoNsr. OF 1846, reprinted in 5 FRANcis N. THORPE,
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In the end, the belief that as a matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion the right to vote presumptively subsumes the right to hold office,
the political ramifications of phrasing the Fifteenth Amendment so as
to contradict that belief, and the time pressure of a Congress about to
change over all contributed to Congress' deletion of the office-hold-
ing provision of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Nor were the states during the ratification period oblivious to the
textual acrobatics being performed in Washington. In Georgia, for
example, Governor Bullock in introducing the amendment for a rati-
fication vote to the legislature observed -that,
[w] ere there any doubt... as to the sufficiency of this Amendment
to confer equal political privileges without regard to race or color,
or were it urged that the right to vote did not necessarily include
the right to hold office, it would certainly be dissipated and an-
swered by the arguments advanced in the debates in Congress on
the passage of the joint resolution proposing the Amendment, as
well as by the expressed opinions of the soundest lawyers of the Na-
tion.... If we ratify this Amendment, to be consistent we must at
once voluntarily yield to colored citizens the right to have their
voices heard in your halls.'
57
And across the continent in California, the Democratic Party platform
likewise argued that the Fifteenth Amendment should be defeated be-
cause it would "give the Negro and Chinaman the right to vote and
hold office."' 58
We have observed that voting was but part of a political rights
package that also included office holding, which many supporters
AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTrrunONS AND ORcamc LAws 2653 (1909). The statutes of New
York did not appear to impose any racial barriers on office holding either. 1 N.Y. REV.
STAT. tit. vi at 116 (1829); see also Paul Finkleman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black
Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 417 (1986) (suggesting that blacks
could hold office under the laws of New York). The statutes of New York did impose a
property requirement on alljurors, and in this way, as Tocqueville observed, New York was
the sole exception to the general rule that those who could vote could serve on juries.
TocQuEvu..E, supra note 16, at 728 app. I. But this juror property requirement applied by
its terms to whites and blacks alike. I am unaware of any other New York statutes that
forbade black office holding or any case law upholding any such statutes against New York
constitutional challenge. Compare White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232, 265-66 (1869) (holding
that the legislature is not free to provide requirements for office when constitution could
have but did not). Of course, even where blacks were permitted by law to hold office and
to serve on juries, such service was rare. See LEON F. LrrwAcK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961);
Finkleman, supra, at 477.
157 See MATHEWs, supra note 135, at 66 (quoting the GEORGIA HOUSE JOURNAL 577
(1869) (remarks of Gov. Bullock)). Although some have questioned whether Bullock truly
believed that Georgia should ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, see Gmuzrrr, supra note 136,
at 101, those who ultimately voted for ratification might well have relied on Bullock's inter-
pretation of the Amendment.
158 MATHEWs, supra note 135, at 72 (quoting EDwARD MCPHERSON, THE PoLrrxcAL HIs-




conceived as being subsumed within voting. How then does a third
element of the package-jury service-fit into the analytic scheme?
The language of the Fifteenth Amendment technically should apply
to jury service because juries vote. Furthermore, we have noted that
American tradition, from the founding through Tocqueville's era, ex-
plicitly links voting and jury service.
A complete answer to the question posed, however, requires that
we examine the first jury exclusion cases decided by the Supreme
Court. Strauder,159 in which the Court relied on the Equal Protection
Clause to overturn a black defendant's conviction by a jury from
which blacks had been explicitly excluded, has received much aca-
demic attention.160 But the issues raised in one of Strauder's compan-
ion cases, Ex parte Virginia,161 are perhaps more illuminating.
Ex parte Virginia involved the federal criminal prosecution of a
Virginia state court judge, who had responsibility to select grand and
petit jurors in his county, for violating a law making it a crime to dis-
qualify any man from state or federal jury service because of his race.
The law was part of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,162 most of whose provi-
sions-those proscribing racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions-were struck down by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights
Cases.163 The jury service provision at issue in Ex parte Virginia, how-
ever, was upheld by the Court over defendant's argument that Con-
gress lacked the authority to prohibit racial discrimination in jury
selection, at least in the state courts.
In rejecting the defendant's contentions, the Court focused on
the rights of black criminal defendants in state courts, even though
the provision at issue in Ex parte Virginia imposed criminal liability
whether or not the discriminatory jury selection process was part of a
prosecution of a black defendant. In fact, the federal indictment in
Ex parte Virginia had not specified any cases in which the judge on trial
had excluded jurors on account of race. Instead, the indictment al-
leged only that the judge had in practice violated the federal statute.
In essence, then, as applied by the federal prosecutors and as it came
to the Court, the federal statute seemed to be concerned not with the
interests of the litigants in particular cases, but rather with the rights
of would-be jurors. Nonetheless, the Court in Ex parte Virginia pig-
gybacked on the Strauder analysis, and held that Congress enjoyed au-
159 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
160 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 16 (analyzing Strauder and discussing other
scholarship).
161 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
162 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988).
163 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down antidiscrimination provisions




thority to enact the criminal provision at issue in order to protect the
equal protection rights of black defendants:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment secures ... to colored men, when
charged with criminal offences against a State, an impartial jury
trial, by jurors indifferently selected or chosen without discrimina-
tion against such jurors because of their color .... [I]mmunity
from any such discrimination [in the right to an impartial jury trial]
is one of the equal rights of all persons, and.., any withholding it
by a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the
meaning of the amendment.... [S]uch an equal right to an impar-
tial jury trial, and such an immunity from unfriendly discrimination,
are placed by the amendment under the protection of the general
government and guaranteed by it.... [T]his protection and this
guarantee, as the fifth section of the amendment expressly ordains,
may be enforced by Congress by means of appropriate
legislation.1
64
As Justice Field's powerful dissent pointed out, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause's broad application to all "persons" undermined the ma-
jority's reasoning: "[T]he universality of the protection secured [by
the Clause] necessarily renders [the majority's] position untena-
ble."1 65 Harkening back to the desire of the Equal Protection Clause's
drafters that aliens be included within the Clause's language, Field
observed:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State, whether permanent
residents or temporary sojourners.... are to be equally protected.
Yet no one will contend that equal protection to... aliens can...
be secured [only by] allowing persons of the class to which they
belong to act as jurors in cases affecting their interests.1
66
If the majority were correct, then, alien criminal defendants-
persons protected against discrimination by the equal protection
clause-would be entitled to have aliens serve on the juries in their
cases. But this simply could not be so. 167 The majority never re-
sponded to Field's argument, nor did the drafters of the statute re-
spond to similar arguments raised by those Congressmen who
164 ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
165 Id. at 367 (1880) (Field,J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Indeed, the Court has stated that citizenship requirements for juror service do not
run afoul of equal protection. SeeCarter v.Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970). This is
not to suggest that aliens have never been allowed onjuries. The early Nineteenth century
device ofjury de medietate linguae allowed aliens to serve on juries in some cases. The com-
mon law practice was never thought to be constitutionally required. See Ex parte irginia,
100 U.S. at 369 (Field,J, dissenting); cf Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jurj and theAncient
Custom of Trial byJuiy De Medietate Linguae: A Histoiy and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L.
REv. 777 (1994).
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opposed the law's passage on the ground that it could not be based on
Congress' power to implement the Equal Protection Clause. 168
The majority also failed to address the related but more general
critique of its Equal Protection Clause analysis-that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend to any political rights, of which jury ser-
vice is just one. And the emphasis in Ex parte Virginia (as well as
Strauder) on the equal protection rights of the defendants, as opposed
to those of the excluded jurors-which are stressed in recent cases-
does nothing to blunt the attack. 169 For if the Ex parte Virginia equal
protection logic is valid, it would also support an argument that a
black man in 1869 (after the Fourteenth Amendment but before the
Fifteenth Amendment) could not, consistent with equal protection,
be required to subject himself to laws resulting from an electoral pro-
cess in which members of his race could not vote. Of course, that
would mean, as a practical matter, that blacks would not be bound by
any laws.
Nor would it make sense to distinguish between the political
rights of voting and jury service for these purposes. If the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not prohibit excluding blacks from voting for
leaders and laws under which blacks must live, it is hard to see why the
clause should prohibit excluding blacks from bodies-like juries-
that administer those laws. If the argument here is that no equal pro-
tection violation exists when blacks are governed by the general laws
that apply to whites, the same argument would likewise apply to juries;
blacks get the same (all white) juries as everyone else, just as women
get the same (all male) juries as others. 170 To approach the issue an-
other way, if whites could be trusted to represent the interests of
168 When Senator Thurman pointed out that the Equal Protection Clause could not
support the jury provision of the 1875 Act because women, children, and aliens were per-
sons protected by the Clause and yet could be properly excluded from serving on juries,
Senator Morton accused Thurman of hiding "behind women .... children . . . [and]
aliens." 3 CONG. REc. 1795 (1875). Senator Thurman acknowledged that the accusations
were rhetorically amusing, but argued in response:
I submit to the Senator whether he has answered my reply at all.
... What was... [the Senator's] answer to ... [my] question? Why,
that [I] ... get[ ] behind the women. That is the logical answer of the able
Senator from Indiana! That is the logical answer of the leader of the repub-
lican party on this floor! That is a specimen of his ability to reason and
reason logically!
Id.
169 Other commentators also have pointed out the flaws of Ex parte Virginia's reliance
on the equal protection rights of the litigants. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 16, at 729-
36. The current Court's decision to invoke the equal protection rights of the excluded
jurors may signify a recognition of the weakness of Ex parte Virginia in this regard. Of
course, the Court's new approach is in similar tension with the history and text of the
Equal Protection Clause, which clearly was not designed to give excluded jurors a political
right of access.
170 See Underwood, supra note 16, at 746-48.
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blacks at the polls and in the legislature, why could not whites be simi-
larly trusted in the jury boxes? The only adequate response to this
question is to deny its premise-that the Equal Protection Clause does
not speak to voting. As the preceding discussion should make clear,
such a denial would be historically difficult at best.
Similar problems plague a Due Process Clause justification for
the results in Strauder and Ex parte Virginia. One might defend the
result in Strauder by arguing that an all-white jury deprives a black
criminal defendant of his due process right to a fair and impartial jury
because black and white jurors might behave differently. If accepted,
this argument requires an explanation for why a randomly selected
jury which happens to be all white does not similarly deprive a black
criminal defendant of his right to a fair jury. Moreover, this due pro-
cess approach does not provide a basis for attacking black juror exclu-
sion when the criminal defendants are whites, as might very well have
been true in Exparte Virginia. As the recent Rodney King criminal and
civil cases illustrate, this due process approach would create an unfor-
tunate dilemma when black jurors are excluded in cases where the
defendant is white but the victim is black.17'
Fortunately there is a better way to analyze, and a coherent way to
uphold, the provision involved in Ex parte Virginia. This way begins
with the statutory language. The first three sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875172-which were held unenforceable in the Civil Rights
Cases-parallel the language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,173 which,
as we have seen, is linked tightly with the Fourteenth Amendment. By
contrast, the jury service provision of the Act at issue in Ex parte Vir-
ginia does not track the language of the Fourteenth Amendment or its
predecessor, but rather tracks the language of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, and tracks it perfectly. The jury service section upheld in Ex
parte Virginia provides:
[N] o citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be
prescribed by law, shall be disqualified from service as grand or petit
jurors in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and any officer or other
person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning ofju-
171 See generally REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLIcE
DEPARTMENT 3-17 (1991) ("The Christopher Commission Report") (describing the Rodney
King incident and its aftermath).
172 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988).
173 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted as amended pursuant to ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)).
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rors, who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause
aforesaid, shall... be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... 174
This in haec verba formulation is itself strong evidence of the linkage
between voting and jury service as part of a political rights package in
the Fifteenth Amendment perceived by the drafters of the Act.
The legislative history of the Act provides support for this connec-
tion. Supporters of the Act were aware and made note of the logical
linkages between the political rights of jury service and voting.' 75
Moreover, and perhaps more important, the parallel language of the
Fifteenth Amendment and the Act was not lost on those who unsuc-
cessfully argued against the law on the grounds that Congress lacked
the power to enact it. Senator Carpenter, in particular, felt compelled
to address the Fifteenth Amendment as a possible basis for the law,
and rejected it because office holding was not explicitly included in
the Fifteenth Amendment, and jury service was office holding of
sorts.
1 7 6
Of course, one response to Senator Carpenter's argument, which
we have seen earlier, is that the Fifteenth Amendment might very well
have included the right to be free from racial discrimination in office
holding, so that even if jury service is office holding, the Fifteenth
Amendment provided a basis for the Act. As a presumptive matter,
absent a clear statement to the contrary in the same document creat-
ing the nondiscrimination right, a constitutional declaration of free-
dom from certain kinds of discrimination in voting subsumes the
freedom from similar discrimination in office holding. This theory
was accepted by many who drafted and ratified the Fifteenth Amend-
ment 177 and has been accepted by the modem Supreme Court.178
174 18 Stat. 335, codfled at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (emphasis added). Compare the text of U.S.
CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged... on account of rae, color, or previous condition of seroitude" (emphasis
added).
175 See 3 CONG. RFc. 1795 (1875) (remarks of Sen. Morton) (discussing right of voting
and jury service together as political rights).
176 Id. at 1863; see also id. at 1796 (similar remarks of Sen. Merrimon); CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1291 (1869) (Sen. Wilson linking jury service and office holding in
discussing the Fifteenth amendment); ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 370 (1879) (Field,J,
dissenting) ("[I]f [Congress] can make the exclusion of persons from jury service on ac-
count of race or color a criminal offense, it can make their exclusion from office on that
account also criminal.").
177 See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1970) (decided the same day as
Carter v.Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), discussed supra note 71, and concluding that
"It] he State may not deny to some the privilege of holding public office that it extends to
others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees"). The
Court went on to cite the voting discrimination cases for support. Id. See also Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721-22 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to vote would
be empty if the State could arbitrarily deny the right to stand for election."); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (observing that "rights of voters and the rights of candi-
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A second response to Senator Carpenter would be that, while jury
service is an important political right, jurors are populist actors and
thus differ from traditional governmental office holders. In this re-
spect, jury service is akin to voting, another populist function. As Sen-
ator Edmunds put it, perhaps overstating the point:
If ajuryman is an officer of a State and holds a political office in the
constitutional sense, there would be a great deal of force [to Sena-
tor Carpenter's argument] .... It is enough to say on that question
merely that in all the history ofjuries from the beginning of the jury
trial a thousand years ago down to this day it has been reserved to
this present time to discover that ajuryman is an officer under the
laws and constitution of any country. A juryman is a man; he is
called by the name of a man and not the name of an official .... 179
Because jury service is closer to voting than to office holding, histori-
cally and structurally, Senator Carpenter's argument that the Fif-
teenth Amendment purposefully excluded office holding, even if
true, would not necessarily carry the day.
The discussion thus far has established thatjury service was linked
to the Fifteenth Amendment in the minds of at least many of its draft-
ers and those who enacted implementing legislation. This linkage is
reflected in the grouping of voting and jury service together as part of
a political rights package that was left out of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's scope but intended to be addressed by the Fifteenth. The
linkage is reinforced by the language and legislative history of the
1875 Civil Rights Act. And the linkage is not undermined by the hur-
ried decision of the Fifteenth Amendment's drafters not to include an
explicit office-holding provision, but rather to represent political
rights more generally by referring to the "right to vote." For many, at
least, although the point was never made as bluntly as I am making it
now, the right to vote presumptively subsumed the right to hold of-
fice, which in turn included the right to sit on juries. Even more di-
dates do not lend themselves to'neat separation"); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 167
n.19 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (right to be free from
racial discrimination in voting subsumes right to be free from similar discrimination in
office holding).
It is noteworthy that Turner predates congressional approval of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, the most recent of the voting rights amendments. Whether or not reading a
constitutional voting protection to include office holding is a sound first principle of con-
stitutional construction, it is one that the framers of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment knew,
or can be presumed to have known, the Court would employ. Because the framers of tlhe
Twenty-Sixth Amendment wanted its meaning to track those of the Fifteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments, their understanding of the language they used sheds interpretive
light on all three amendments. See Amar, supra note 92, at 1201-03; Akhil Reed Amar, On
Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 40-41 (1994).
179 3 CONG. RIc. 1866 (1875) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Edmunds, it should be
noted, was one who thought that an explicit office holding provision was necessary to make
the Fifteenth Amendment complete. See GaLsuTr, supra note 119, at 70-71.
[Vol. 80:203
JURY SERVICE
rectly, ordinary voters in America had always been jurors, as
Tocqueville remarked upon, and so the general right to vote quite
naturally included the right to serve, and vote, on juries.
In any event, the Fifteenth Amendment is assuredly a more plausi-
ble constitutional basis on which to prohibit racial discrimination in
jury service than is the Fourteenth Amendment, whose text and his-
tory make clear that political rights-including jury service-were not
covered.180 To the extent that the text, structure, and history of the
reconstruction amendments speak to racial discrimination on juries,
they do so through the Fifteenth Amendment. Given this, the Court
was remiss in failing to explicitly invoke the amendment to support its
results in Ex parte Virginia and Strauder.181
b. The Nineteenth Amendment
Unlike the linkage betweenjury service and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, the historical connection between the women's suffrage move-
ment and jury service has been explored in both historical and legal
literature. Rather than recount the evidence that supports this con-
nection, I shall briefly cover the main issues and leave the reader to
examine the sources cited herein.
There is much support for the proposition that the struggle for
women's suffrage was, from the outset, "also about the right to serve
on juries [and that] ... [t]he two causes were the twin indicia of full
citizenship" for those who favored the elimination of gender discrimi-
nation at the polls. 182 Professor Rhode has documented the persis-
tent and unsuccessful efforts by early feminists to gain jury service for
women. 183 Moreover, the linkage between voting and jury service was
well understood by those who opposed women's suffrage; indeed,
many opponents thought that jury service would flow inexorably from
the vote.184 In California, for example, a leading opponent of the wo-
men's vote movement tried to defeat the legislative suffrage effort by
180 Cf Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1019, 1043 (1992) (suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment, interpreted in light of the
Fifteenth Amendment, justifies the result in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879)).
181 In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 408 (1991), the Court came close to recognizing
explicitly the connection between jury service and the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion for the Court cited the statute that had been at issue in Exparte Virginia one
paragraph after likening discrimination in jury service to racial discrimination in voting.
Unfortunately, the Court did not emphasize the parallelism in the language of the Act and
the Fifteenth Amendment. Cf Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 168 (1910) (up-
holding key man& discretionary scheme because it did not necessarily lead to discrimination
"on account of race, color or previous condition").
182 Babcock, supra note 22, at 1165.
183 DEBORAH RHODE, JusncE Am GENDER 48-50 (1989).
184 Babcock, supra note 22, at 1166-74.
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pointing out the harm that would flow to women from having to hear
evidence in court and being sequestered with male jurors. 185 Other
opponents to suffrage, also assuming it went hand in hand with jury
service, objected to the possibility that women might vote only for
handsome men, in both elections and on juries. s6
Despite widespread recognition of the link between these two as-
pects of public service, women's access to juries did not follow the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment as a matter of course. Activ-
ists took three distinct litigation tacts, with varying success. Some ar-
gued from plain meaning: jurors vote. Some argued that because
state law made jury service dependent on voting eligibility, the Nine-
teenth Amendment effectively amended state laws. And some argued
that if women were qualified for the franchise, they were a fortiori
qualified for jury service-that it was nonsensical, constitutionally irra-
tional if you will, to allow women to vote but not serve on juries.
While some state courts embraced one or more of these notions, most
rejected them. 8 7 Notably, the United States Supreme Court did not
rule on the issue, perhaps in part because the jury trial requirements
of the Bill of Rights were not understood at that time to apply against
the states.188 Moreover, the reasoning of these state cases-that exclu-
sion of women does not meaningfully affect the decisionmaking pro-




As noted earlier, the first and unsuccessful efforts to eliminate
poll taxes, in all elections, were made in the initial drafting of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 90 Ordinary legislation which, like the ulti-
mately enacted Twenty-Fourth Amendment, would have outlawed the
poll tax in federal elections was passed in the House in the 77th, 78th,
79th, 80th, and 81st Congresses from the years 1942 to 1950.' 1 The
185 Id. at 1167.
186 Id. at 1168.
187 See, e.g., McDaniels v. State, 158 P.2d 151 (Ariz. 1945); Powers v. State, 157 S.E. 195
(Ga. 1931); State v. Emery, 31 S.E.2d 858 (N.C. 1944); State v. James, 114 A. 553 (N.J.
1921); In re Grilli, 179 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Glover v. Cobb, 123 S.W. 2d 794 (Tex.
1938); see generally Note, Jurors-Effect of the 19th Amendment on Qualifications ofJurors,,21 ILL.
L. Rnv. 292 (1926).
188 The Sixth Amendment was held to apply to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). The grand jury provisions of the Fifth Amendment, however, do not
apply to the States. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Court has never ruled
directly on whether the Seventh Amendment's civil jury provisions apply to the States.
189 329 U.S. 187 (1946). For a discussion of Ballard, see supra notes 35-36, infra notes
216-21 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
91 See 108 CONG. REc. 17,656 (1962) (statement of Rep. Celler).
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Senate did not pass any of these bills, but passed its own anti-poll-tax
bill-which the House never passed-in the 86th Congress in 1958.192
From 1870 through 1962, when the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
was considered and passed by the 88th Congress, the link between
poll taxes and racial discrimination was recognized. 193 To the extent
that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment is concerned with race discrimi-
nation, little need be said here in addition to the earlier discussion of
the Civil War amendments. Unlike the Fifteenth, however, the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment is not phrased in terms of "race, color or
condition of previous servitude," but rather applies to all poll taxes
and other taxes in federal elections. 194 Nor was this phrasing just an
imprecise way of dealing with the race issue. Many of the Amend-
ment's backers expressed concern over the political participation of a
group that overlapped with, but was distinct from, the black commu-
nity: the poor. One supporter responded to the idea that poll taxes
were de minimis by saying:
[A] dollar and a half or two dollars is a lot of money to [a] man who
only makes two or three hundred a year. Any charge for voting un-
justly discriminates against people of limited means. And whatever
the amount of money, a citizen of the United States should not have
to pay for his constitutional right to vote.'
95
Concern about the political involvement of the poor is relevant to
the present discussion because of the way in which supporters of the
Amendment spoke out on the invidious discrimination against the
poor with respect to political participation. This form of class discrim-
192 Se id.
193 One supporter of the amendment in 1962 put it this way:
Recent studies of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights revealed on the
whole that the imposition of the poll tax has not been administered in a
discriminatory manner, but the power to do so is resident therein. Past
history is replete with discrimination. Present history still records some un-
just brakes on the right to vote. For too long a time have the rights of
minorities been trammeled and trampled upon; 100 years have elapsed
since the Emancipation Proclamation. That is a long time. Emancipation
has still not been fully achieved. Certainly there should be no longer any
procrastination in consigning the poll tax to limbo.
Id. at 17,656 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
. This sentiment was echoed repeatedly throughout the Congressional consideration
,period. See id. at 17,664, 17,665, 17,667, 17,669 (statements of Reps. Ryan, Stratton, Gal-
lagher, and Halpem) (noting effect of poll taxes on blacks); id. at 4585 (remarks of Sen.
Yarborough) (same). Indeed, many argued during the debate on the Amendment that
because poll taxes were in fact racially discriminatory, Congress could and perhaps should
outlaw them with simple legislation under the enforcement powers of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. See, e.g., id. at 17,669 (remarks of Rep. Halpern).
194. The broad sweep of the text was not lost on the drafters. See, e.g., id. at 17,655
(remarks of Rep. Dingell) (noting breadth of amendment's application).
195 Id. at 17,667 (remarks of Rep. Gallagher). See also id. at 17,662 (remarks of Rep.
Joelson and Sen. Yarborough).
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ination was called "undemocratic"196 and even "un-American."19 7
Representative Fascell captured this sentiment when he spoke broadly
of the need for the political processes to be open to input from the
poor:
The payment of money, whether directly or indirectly, whether in a
small amount or in a large amount, should never be permitted to
reign as a criterion of democracy....
We have come a long way in the constitutional history of this
great Nation .... Certainly, we do not intend to permit money-
however insignificant the amount-to remain as a criteria for the
freeman to exercise this privilege of participation in his
government.'9
8
This democratic theme of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was
highlighted two years later in the Supreme Court's opinion in Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,'9 9 in which the Court extended the anti-
poll-tax norm of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to state elections via
the Equal Protection Clause. This theme also harkens back to Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 200 a case involving the exclusion of poor persons
from juries. The structural similarity between Harpers extension of
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment norm in the name of democracy on
the one hand, and Thiers discussion of the democratic nature ofjuries
on the other, will be taken up below.
20 '
d. Twenty-Sixth Amendment
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment20 2 was passed and ratified in 1971.
The amendment process gained momentum after the Court in Oregon
v. Mitchel20 held, by a 5-4 vote, that a federal statute which prohibited
age discrimination in voting against persons over eighteen years of
age in elections for state and federal offices could not constitutionally
be applied to elections for state offices. Much of the discussion lead-
ing up to the passage in Congress of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
concerned the involvement of young persons in the Vietnam War.
20 4
This discussion is very relevant to the jury service question as well: just
as it might be thought unfair for young adults to fight and die in a war
196 See, e.g., id. at 17,657 (Rep. Fascell, quoting Sen. Holland); id. at 17,662, 17,663,
17,666 (remarks of Reps. Joelson, Moorehead, and Boland).
197 See e.g., id at 17,662 (remarks of Rep. Joelson).
198 Id. at 17,657 (remarks of Rep. Fascell).
199 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
200 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
201 See infra part II.A.3.
202 See supra note 86 for the text of the Amendment.
203 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (5-4 decision).
204 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971).
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without being able to voice their opposition to it in federal and state
elections, so too it might be unfair to prosecute them for evading the
draft or protesting the war without allowing their peers to be on juries
in those cases. This discussion of fairness is just one of the features of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment ratification process relevant to the pres-
ent inquiry.
To begin with, note the language of the Amendment. It does not
say merely that states shall reduce their voting age to eighteen.
Rather, it provides that the right of persons eighteen or older to vote
cannot be abridged on account of age: textually, then, age cannot be
used as a criterion for withholding the core political right of voting.
In this sense, the Amendment self-consciously tracks the language of
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, with the same intended
consequences. 205
Moreover, in describing the intended effects of the Amendment,
its supporters spoke broadly of its impact upon political participation
generally. President Nixon's attorney general spoke for his boss by
saying:
America's 10 million young people between the ages of 18 and 21
are better equipped today than ever in the past to be entrusted with
all of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship. Their well-
informed intelligence, enthusiastic interest, and desire to partici-
pate in public affairs at all levels exemplifies the highest qualities of
mature citizenship.206
Representative Poff was even more direct about the way in which
the amendment was meant to facilitate the fullest possible political
participation. Addressing the House and quoting the committee re-
port, he described the Amendment as conferring "a plenary right on
citizens 18 years of age or older to participate in the political process,
free from discrimination on account of age."20 7 Representative Poff
205 See 117 CONG. REc. 7539 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Pepper) ("What we propose to do
... is exactly what we did in ... the 15th amendment and. . . the 19th amendment.
Therefore, it seems to me that this proposed amendment is perfectly in consonance with
those precedents."); id. at 7534 (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("What does the proposed constitu-
tional amendment accomplish?... [I]t guarantees that citizens who are 18 years of age or
older shall not be discriminated against on account of age. Just as the 15th amendment
prohibits racial discrimination in voting and just as the 19th amendment prohibits sex
discrimination in voting, the proposed amendment would prohibit age discrimination in
voting.").
206 S. REP. No. 92, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). See also id (quoting Senator Ken-
nedy's testimony that "the time has come.., to bring American youth into the mainstream
of our political process. To me, this is the most important single principle we can pursue
as a nation if we are to succeed in bringing our youth into full and lasting participation in
our institutions of democratic government."); 117 CONG. REc. 7546 (1971) (remarks of
Rep. Ford) (proposed amendment "affords today's youth a great opportunity to ... make
its voice heard at all levels of Government").
207 117 CONG. REc. 7535 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
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went on to explain in an address to his fellow House members that
"[t] he 'right to vote' is a constitutional phrase of art whose scope em-
braces the entire process by which people make their political
choices." 208 Thus, noted Poff, unlike the congressional statute that
was at issue in Mitchel4 the Amendment was not limited to particular
kinds of voting, but rather applied to nominating activities, and even
to voting by which voters make law, as in the case of an initiative.20 9
Indeed, the only limitations he saw on the "plenary right" were those
which were already built into the Constitution and which the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment did not purport to amend-the age limitations for
elective office.2 10 In Poff's mind, the right to be free from age dis-
crimination in voting-that is, in "choosing-did not call into ques-
tion the validity of age requirements for elective office "candidates-
those who seek to be a choice."21' (And here we see how the pre-
sumptive linkage between voting and office holding could be broken
by clear constitutional text to the contrary.) But with that single, tex-
tually-clear exception, the freedom from age discrimination in the
right to vote was representative of212 and subsumed all political voting
activities.
Finally, the reasons offered for inclusion of younger persons in
the voting process parallel the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment ju-
ror exclusion jurisprudence, which requires that a group bring some-
thing distinctive to the deliberative process to be found cognizable.
The Senate report on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment observed:
[Tihese younger voters should be given the right to full participa-
tion in our political system because they will contribute a great deal
to our society... [T]he student unrest of recent years... reflects
the interest and concern of today's youth over the important issues
of our day. The deep commitment of those 18 to 21 years old is
often the idealism which Senator Barry Goldwater has said "is ex-
actly what we need more of in the country."213
If young people are mature and distinct enough to contribute
something special-that is, to add a flavor-to the electoral process, it




211 Id. See also id. at 7540 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) (proposed amendment does not
prevent states "if they wish, [from] followiing] the Federal pattern and impos[ing] more
restrictive age standards for holding elective office").
212 Cf. S. REP. No. 92, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971) (statement of San Francisco State
University President S.I. Hayakawa that voting has a "symbolic" meaning).





When looking at the Supreme Court case law, we see that the
Court has already held cognizable the same groups that enjoy specific
constitutional protection against voting discrimination, except for
age-defined groups. Blacks and other racial groups have been pro-
tected against jury exclusion essentially since Strauder.2' 4
Each of the sexes has also received judicial protection. The
Court's decision in J.E.B.215 last term, holding that Georgia's gender-
based peremptories violated the equal protection rights of excluded
men jurors, was the latest in a long line ofjury cases involving gender.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion rested clearly on equal protec-
tion grounds, but it drew its strength from earlier cases that had invali-
dated the exclusion or underrepresentation of women on other legal
theories. The first case protecting women against jury exclusion was
Ballard v. United States,2 16 in which male criminal defendants objected
to the lack of women in the jury pool. Acting under its supervisory
powers over lower federal courts, the Court reversed the men's convic-
tions because the exclusion of women deprived "the jury system of the
broad base it was designed to have in our democratic society."217 That
exclusion of women from juries was constitutionally dubious, and not
just bad policy, was made clear by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana.218
In concluding that the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment was violated by the automatic exemption from jury ser-
vice of all women-but not men-who asked for it, a procedure which
had the effect of underrepresenting women,219 the Taylor Court bor-
214 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
215 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
216 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
217 Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. See also Babcock, supra note 22, at 1155 (discussing democ-
racy theme in Ballard).
218 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
219 The statute at issue in Taylor provided that a woman should not be selected forjury
service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her desire to serve. Men
were eligible forjury service whether they had declared a desire to serve or not. 419 U.S. at
523. This scheme thus placed a burden upon women simply on account of their gender.
But the "opt-in" character of the scheme proved to be of little constitutional importance, as
the Court made clear four terms later in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Duren
held invalid a scheme in which women but not men could, upon demand, "opt out" ofjury
service.
The Duren Court was correct in concluding that Missouri's system raised the same
problems as did Louisiana's in Taylor. Even though Missouri's statute did not require wo-
men to take any affirmative action if they wanted to serve on juries, it singled out women
for different treatment than men. The Missouri scheme, in effect, required women to
forgo a benefit-the value of their time-in order to exercise a right of political participa-
tion. Men, on the other hand, did not have to make any such choice because they had no
"opt out" alternative. It is as if Missouri had offered women a bribe-in the form of free
time-not to participate in a governmental process. Needless to say, an explicit monetary
bribe to women not to participate, for example not to vote, would be constitutionally ima-
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rowed heavily from Ballard. Indeed, the Court suggested that the Bal-
lard decision itself was founded on constitutional principle, and that
the only reason Ballard did not rely explicitly on the Constitution is
that the fair cross-section requirement as a constitutional imperative
was not yet understood.
220
Taylor is not the only explicitly constitutional case to wrap itself in
the Ballard language. As professor Babcock has pointed out, Ballard is
one of the two major cases the Court cited in Batson221 to support the
blending of the defendant's rights with those of the excluded juror.
The other case on which Batson relied in this regard was Thiel,222 de-
cided the term before Ballard, and involving exclusion of another
group that is protected against voting discrimination-persons of low
socioeconomic status.
Thiel was a federal civil case 223 brought by a man who threw him-
self out of a moving train. In his negligence suit against the railroad,
the plaintiff challenged the composition of the jury, which he con-
tended was made up mostly of "business executives or those having
the employer's viewpoint"224 because of a jury selection procedure
that discriminated against those of the poorer classes.225 The undis-
puted evidence showed that the clerk of the court and the jury com-
missioner deliberately excluded from the jury lists all persons who
worked for a daily wage, because for those persons jury service tended
to be more of a financial hardship. 22
6
On these facts, the Court reversed the judgment against Mr.
Thiel. In language that has been characterized as "ring[ing] with af-
permissible. But cf. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (unanimous Court entirely
missing this point in upholding tax from which women could escape by declining to regis-
ter to vote).
The Missouri scheme ultimately harmed women by devaluing their input in the law-
shaping process and perpetuating gender stereotypes. The Court also found that the Mis-
souri law deprived criminal defendants of the chance to have women on their juries be-
cause the scheme resulted in the systematic underrepresentation of women.
220 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. The Court in Taylor stated the "very matter" presented for
review, that is, the "judgment that women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men
and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair
cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied," was "debated in Ballard" The Court went
on to describe the result of that debate: "Positing the fair cross-section rule-there said to
be a statutory one-the Court [in Ballard] concluded that the systematic exclusion of wo-
men was unacceptable." Id. From there the Taylor Court went on to quote Ballarfs now-
famous "flavor" language. See supra text accompanying note 36.
221 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
222 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
223 Thiel was filed initially in state court and removed to federal court on diversity
grounds. 328 U.S. at 219.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 221-22.
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firmations of the jury's fundamental role in a democratic society"227
the Court proclaimed:
Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class mat-
ter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard
it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which
are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
... Jury competence is not limited to those who earn their live-
lihood on other than a daily basis. One who is paid $3 a day may be
as fully competent as one who is paid $30 a week or $300 a
month.... [T]he pay period of a particular individual is completely
irrelevant to his eligibility and capacity to serve as a juror. Wage
earners, including those who are paid by the day, constitute a very
substantial portion of the community, a portion that cannot be in-
tentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in part without
doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system. Were
we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would encourage
whatever desires those responsible for the selection of the jury
panels may have to discriminate against persons of low economic
and social status.... That we refuse to do.
228
In other words, people who may feel hardship from jury duty-who
are the same people who would feel hardship from the imposition of a
poll tax-ought not to be left out of this important democratic pro-
cess. Indeed, the Court suggested, their involvement is so important
that they might even have to suffer a little hardship.2 29
Thiel like Ballard, was by its terms a supervisory power case.230
Yet, like Ballard, it seems to have constitutional foundations. It is cited
prominently, albeit generically, in Batson and other post-Batson consti-
227 Babcock, supra note 22, at 1155.
228 Thie4 328 U.S. at 220, 223-24 (footnote omitted).
229 See id. at 224. In effect, the Thiel Court was unwilling to uphold a de facto "opt out
at will" scheme for the poor. This inclination foreshadowed its approach in Duren, which
involved an opt-out scheme for womenjurors. In both cases the Court recognized at least
implicitly that the class to whom the "option" is given ultimately is injured by its exercise of
the option and must be protected by the Court. See Thie, 328 U.S. at 224 ("[We do not
want to] breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of
the economically and socially privileged."); see also supra note 219, discussing Duren.
230 Indeed, a year after Thiel was decided, a litigant challenging the jury selection pro-
cedure in a state court tried to rely upon the principles in Thie4 only to be reminded that
Thiel was inapposite because, among other reasons, it was at that time limited to the federal
court supervisory power context. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947).
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tutional cases.23' Moreover, lower courts have afforded it explicit con-
stitutional stature.2 32
Most important, the logic of Thiel suggests a constitutional rule.
To see this, consider the 1966 case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions,2 33 in which the Court invalidated a state election poll tax, in
spite of the fact that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment-ratified just two
years earlier-by its terms did not apply to poll taxes in state elections.
(And here the Twenty-Fourth Amendment differs from its right to
vote cousins-the Fifteenth and Nineteenth-which apply to state
and federal governments alike.) In striking down Virginia's law on
equal protection grounds, the Court used language that, like Thiel's, is
"ring[ing] with affirmation of the [voter's] fundamental role in a
democratic society":
[T]he political franchise of voting [is] a fundamental political right,
because [it is] preservative of all rights.... Undoubtedly, the right
of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 234
Tracking the logic and language of Thie4 the Harper Court went on:
Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not
paying this or any other tax....
... Wealth, like race, creed or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process .... To
introduce wealth or payment of a... fee is to introduce a capricious
or irrelevant factor.235
To say something is irrelevant is, of course, to beg the question-
relevant to what? Every law, after all, is perfectly relevant to at least
one purpose-that defined by the scope of the law itself.2 36 But the
231 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). It is interesting to note
that Thiel was not cited favorably by the majority of the Court in a constitutional case until
after the enactment of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
232 See, e.g., Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs,
622 F.2d 807, 817 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing earlier Fifth Circuit case as having "established
that the principle of Thiel has constitutional foundations in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981).
233 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
234 Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quotingYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), and
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cita-
tions omitted).
235 Harper, 383 U.S. at 666, 668 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).




Equal Protection Clause (if it applies) requires, at a minimum, that a
law be relevant to a legitimate purpose. The question in Harper, then,
was really whether an objective of limiting political participation of
poor persons because, say, they may lack sufficient stake in the system,
is constitutionally legitimate. What makes such an objective illegitimate
is the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, or at least the norm it embodies. 23 7
In the end, then, although the opinion in Harper is built on the Equal
Protection Clause, the essence of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment is
doing the work.
Whatever the concept of irrelevance entails, the Court held in
Thiel and Harper that wealth is irrelevant to both jury service and vot-
ing. If that irrelevance makes wealth distinctions in voting rights un-
constitutional, it should do the same with respect to jury service.
Indeed, given Harper, can anyone imagine a different result if the facts
of Thiel arose today in a state criminal case (in which the right to a
jury would attach)? 238 Or, for that matter, that a 'jury tax" would be
upheld?
It is of course possible that Harper was incorrectly decided. After
all, it should be clear from the earlier discussion that Harpers reliance
on the Fourteenth Amendment in the voting context is historically
questionable. But if the result in Harper is wrong, it is so only because
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, unlike the Fifteenth and Nineteenth,
does not apply to state governments. Accordingly, if Harper's exten-
sion of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment's norm to state governments
were reconsidered, then Thie's rule might also remain limited to fed-
eral courts. In any event, the protection from discrimination afforded
the poor would-and should-be the same for voting and jury service.
Thus, groups defined by race, gender, and economic class are
protected by voting discrimination amendments and insulated from
discrimination in jury service. Age-defined groups have secured pro-
tection from voting discrimination but have not yet been considered
237 See Amar, supra note 116, at 1205 (discussing declaratory theory of constitutional
law).
238 But seeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 ("Parties may also exercise
their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any group or class of individuals
normally subject to 'rational basis' review," of which wealth would be one.). It seems
doubtful thatJustice Blackmun intended to suggest in J.E.B. that the result in Thiel is not
constitutionally required. Indeed, in other parts of the JE.B. opinion, Justice Blackmun
quoted extensively and approvingly from Thiel. See id. at 1430 n.19 (reiterating Thiefrs proc-
lamation that jury service is an "individual" matter and that economic or social classes
cannot be excluded). Of course, the Court could try to draw a line-for constitutional
purposes-between venire constitution and peremptory challenges. But since both involve
state action, any such line would be completely artificial. JE.B.'s contradictory treatment
of Thiel-like the tension between the equal protection and Sixth Amendment rhetoric
withinJE.B., see supra notes 41-42, and accompanying text-points up the intellectual slop-
piness of the J.E.B. opinion and its doctrinal basis.
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by the Supreme Court in ajury selection case. When confronted with
such a case, the Court should continue to bat one thousand.
B. Defining Age Groups by Reference to Other Political
Participation Provisions in the Constitution
The answer to the second slippery slope, that of defining age-
based groups, begins where the answer to the first left off historically,
with the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. As noted above, the text speaks
broadly against abridgments on "account of age." Thus, if age* is an
explicit criterion for selection, no definition is necessary. But where
systematic underrepresentation is not explicitly age based,23 9 the sev-
eral age points already found in the Constitution's text help solve the
definitional problem thus presented. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
refers to persons over eighteen years old; eighteen is thus the lowest
end point. The other age provisions in the Constitution-twenty-five
for House members, thirty for Senators, and thirty-five for the Presi-
dent-reflect a constitutional judgment that people in these age
groups may make different choices with respect to the administration
of government.
The history of the framing period bears out the relevance of
these age points. Indeed, that some age lines would be drawn for vari-
ous federal elective office was taken for granted and did not occupy
much time or energy at the federal or ratifying conventions. The
Framers readily recognized that age affects one's political perspective
and participation.24° In this vein, Joseph Story explained the decision
to set the House age minimum at twenty-five rather than twenty-one:
Would the mere attainment of twenty-one years of age be a more
proper qualification? All just reasoning would be against it. The
characters and passions of young men can scarcely be understood at
the moment of their majority. They are then new to the rights of
self-government; warm in their passions; ardent in their expecta-
tions; and ... are strongly tempted to discard the lessons of caution,
which riper years inculcate.
241
To the same effect was Story's observation that a twenty-five-year
old's outlook differed from that of a thirty-year old for the purposes of
determining an appropriate age for the Senate.2 42 For the particular
239 On whether underrepresentation is itself actionable, see infra part III.
240 See, e.g., JOSEPH P. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 232 (1833).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 265-66 ("The age of Senators was fixed in the constitution at first by a vote of
seven states against four; and finally, by an unanimous vote. Perhaps no one, in our day, is
disposed to question the propriety of this limitation .... If counsels are to be wise, the
ardour, and impetuosity, and confidence of our youth must be chastised by the sober les-
sons of experience; and if knowledge, and solidjudgment, and tried integrity, are to be
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skills of the presidency, an even higher age was considered
necessary.2
43
Each age group defined by the Constitution is thus different with
regard to political participation. Each adds a flavor, to use the Court's
rhetoric, to the political process. Nor is the selection of these num-
bers arbitrary in the way that the Court's "flavor" approach in the
Sixth Amendment context might be thought arbitrary. The age
groupings are not arbitrary for present purposes244 because they were
chosen by the Constitution, even though the numbers on the constitu-
tional age line may have had an arbitrary quality when chosen.
C. Locating Jury Service in the Context of Rights of Political
Participation-The Special Case of Age
The Constitution's built-in age distinctions regarding elective of-
fice make clear that while voting, jury service and office holding are
related political rights, age distinctions in each are not always treated
by the Constitution the same way. But this observation in no way un-
dercuts my claim that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits age dis-
crimination in jury service against any person eighteen years of age,
even if jury service is considered office holding. As noted earlier, the
Court has accepted the view of many Fifteenth Amendment framers
that, as a general constitutional presumption, the right to be free
from discrimination in voting implies a right to be free from similar
discrimination in office holding.2 45 As Representative Poff under-
stood during the course of the debate on the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment, this general constitutional principle may be trumped by specific
constitutional provisions relating to elective office.2 46 But since the
Constitution does not proscribe age qualifications for jurors, the gen-
eral principle would apply to the "office" of a jury.
And it is no accident that the Constitution provides age require-
ments for federal elective offices but not forjuries. The elective office
deemed indispensable qualifications for senatorial service, it would be rashness to affirm,
that thirty years is too long a period for a due maturity and probation.").
243 See STORY, supra note 240, at 540 ("Considering the nature of the duties, the extent
of the information, and the solid wisdom and experience required in the executive depart-
ment, no one can reasonably doubt the propriety of some qualification of age. That which
has been selected, is the middle age of life, by which period.., opportunities have been
afforded for... [relevant] experience.").
244 One might object that these numbers are obsolete because people's life expectan-
cies and maturation patterns have changed since the framing. Whether or not this is true,
the objection should fail. Could anyone plausibly suggest that a President needs to be
older than 35 to be constitutionally qualified today? Most important, whether or not the
Constitution's numbers are dated, we have not yet changed them.
245 See supra notes 140-58, 178 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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exception 247 to the "plenary" right to be free from age discrimination
in political participation makes sense when we remember, as Senator
Edmunds observed over a hundred years ago,248 that political elective
offices are fundamentally different than juries, which were intended
to be filled by a much broader class of the electorate. Indeed, juries
were to be populated by persons-rotating and common-who would
not normally have an opportunity to be elective office holders.
2 49
Treating jurors differently than elected officials also makes sense in
light of the temporary nature ofjurors' service. Like early militiamen,
jurors are ordinary citizens, not permanent government officials on
the government payroll.
250
Nor does the fact thatjurors "make" law mean that they ought to
be considered comparable to elective office holders. After all, citizens
voting in initiatives are office holders of sorts in that they "make" law.
As Professor Eule has put it, "[w] hen the electorate enacts laws it acts
not as a sovereign people but as a governmental body" subject to re-
quirements placed on all state actors.2 51 And yet, initiative voters are
clearly protected by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.2 52 These initiative
voters retain Twenty-Sixth Amendment protection not because they
are not office holders in some broad sense, but because of the popu-
list character of their office. The same is true of jurors.
In the end, the Court appears to have recognized all of this, and
the essentially populist nature of juries has led the Court in Powers
253
and Edmonson2 54 to compare the voting that takes place in ajury room
to that which takes place in an election booth, rather than that which
occurs on the floor of Congress. And so we come back yet again to
the easiest textual and historical argument: jurors vote and voters
have traditionally been jurors.
III
APPLICATIONS
The focus of this piece has been the link between jury service and
the right to be free from discrimination in voting. But how do these
247 Whether the exception extends to state elective offices, as suggested by some of the
legislative history of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, see supra note 211, is a question I leave
for another day.
248 See supra text accompanying note 179.
249 See Amar, supra note 92, at 1187.
250 See, e.g., TOCQuEViLLE, supra note 16, at 250 ("By a jury' I mean a certain number
of citizens... temporarily invested with the right to judge.").
251 Julian N. Eule,judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1537-38 (1990).
252 Nor would initiative voters lose Twenty-Sixth Amendment protection if the State
paid them nominal compensation comparable to that given to jurors in order to increase
the initiative turnout.
253 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
254 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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insights play out doctrinally? There are a number of possibilities,
which are not mutually exclusive.
A. Direct Causes of Action Under the Voting Rights
Amendments
The first, most logically coherent, and historically consistent doc-
trinal means for incorporating the link between jury service and vot-
ing would be direct causes of action under the voting rights
amendments themselves. Just as the Fifteenth Amendment provided
a basis for prohibiting racial discrimination in juries in Ex parte Vir-
ginia, the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth should pro-
hibit the consideration of sex, 255 wealth, or age in jury selections.
Young adults should be able to sue to vindicate their right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of age with respect to jury service,
which is part of their "plenary" right of political participation. This
right would attach in both state and federal juries or jury-like political
bodies, and thus would apply to state grand and civil petitjury compo-
sition. Peremptory challenges and systematically discriminatory ve-
nire establishment devices would be covered.25 6 To the extent that
the historically permissible practice of peremptory challenges is thus
limited, the limitations are imposed by intervening constitutional de-
velopments extending to more persons the meaning of full political
citizenship.
This direct voting discrimination amendment approach raises at
least two additional issues. The first is the kind of showing of intent a
person allegedly excluded on the basis of age would have to make.
Causes of action under other voting rights amendments, for example
the Fifteenth, have embodied an "intentional discrimination" require-
ment akin to that imposed on complainants under the equal protec-
255 Although I have explored the common ground between jury service and voting
primarily through the age-group cases and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, my conclusions
apply with equal force to cases involving the Nineteenth Amendment. Because the terms
of the Nineteenth Amendment prohibit discrimination on account of "sex," men's voices
may not be excluded from the jury box any more than women's. The Court explicitly
recognized in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937), that the Nineteenth Amend-
ment "applies to men and women alike." Thus, whether or not the Nineteenth Amend-
ment allows for some gender-based jury selection in order to insure that both male and
female perspectives are present, see infra note 259 and accompanying text, the near-total
exclusion of one gender cannot be tolerated. In this way, JE.B. was a much easier case
than the Court made it out to be. Unfortunately, the Court alluded to the Nineteenth
Amendment only in passing, and does not yet appear to appreciate fully the Amendment's
relevance in the jury context.
256 The Court has concluded that government participation in enforcing peremptories
constitutes state action. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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tion clause. 25 7 But, as Professor Ortiz has pointed out, in the voting
rights context the intent requirement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments has been watered down such that the Court has been
much more willing to accept a disparate impact theory than in other
areas of equal protection law.
258
What Professor Ortiz observes may be no accident. If political
rights are protected by different provisions of the Constitution than
are civil rights, one must ask whether the concept of equality embod-
ied in the political rights provisions might be different as well. In
other words, the Supreme Court may have hit on something in the
earlier jury cases when its focus on flavors, voices and perspectives led
it to care about actual inclusion of different groups in the political
jury process. And whether or not actual inclusion is constitutionally re-
quired in the political rights realm, legislative attempts to accomplish
racial or gender balance in political processes-"affirmative action" in
the political rights context, if you will-might be a constitutionally dif-
ferent matter than affirmative action in the civil rights context.
259
In any event, the appropriate question to ask with respect to any
de facto or systematic exclusion of young jurors is whether such sys-
tematic exclusion would be tolerated with respect to voting; intent
should be treated similarly for voting and jury exclusion. For this reason, we
must ask ourselves whether the Government could, consistent with the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, hold brief voting registration periods only
once every four years in the name of administrative convenience. The
answer is clearly no. The infrequent (every four years) refilling ofjury
wheels ought to be equally suspect.
260
257 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (Fifteenth Amendment claim requires
same showing of intent as does equal protection claim). Satisfaction of even the most
stringent intent requirement would not be difficult for those challenging statutes that ex-
plicitly exclude 18 to 21 year olds from jury service, or in those cases where age is acknowl-
edged to be a criterion by the person or institution excluding the would-be juror. For
examples of both of these, see supra part I.
258 See Ortiz, supra note 25, at 1126-1131. Professor Ortiz argues powerfully that the
Court's decisions in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982), indicate that in voting context, the intent requirement is satisfied by a
"showing of disparate impact plus a showing that thejurisdiction [involved] has engaged in
other types of discrimination in the past. ... In voting cases, the intent requirement does
not demand any showing of actual discriminatory motivation in the decision to adopt or
retain the [voting system at issue]." Ortiz, supra note 25, at 1127-28.
259 This possibility is the subject of a forthcoming joint piece on which I am currently
at work with my colleague Alan Brownstein.
260 This is not to say that the government would not be able to justify the refilling
scheme on administrative cost grounds. The Court in Hamling was certainly correct in
stating that there needs to be some play in the jury wheel refilling system. But we should be
skeptical of such justifications, just as we are skeptical of grandfather clause requirements
for voting and other rights, because such requirements may mask an intent to perpetuate
the exclusion of certain groups. Cf Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (invalidating
renewed use ofjury selection procedure that had at one time been racially motivated).
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Another relevant issue is whether litigants would have third-party
standing to raise the claims of persons excluded on the basis of age.
The Court has identified three "criteria" that must be satisfied before
litigants can raise the rights of others: the litigant must have suffered
an injury in fact; the litigant must have a close relation to the third-
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability
to protect his or her own interests.2 61 The Court has found these cri-
teria to be satisfied where a litigant in a criminal or civil case raises
equal protection claims on behalf of jurors excluded by perempto-
ries.2 62 The same should be true when jurors are excluded not by
peremptories but rather by systematic exclusions inherent in the ve-
nire establishment process, 2 63 and when the illegality of the exclusion
stems not from equal protection concerns but from the specific polit-
ical participation rights provided for in the Constitution.
B. Equal Protection
An alternative would be to incorporate the argument of this Arti-
cle into the equal protection doctrine of juror exclusion. As sug-
gested above, this (and any other Fourteenth Amendment) doctrinal
basis is difficult to maintain if textual analysis and historical context
are to be given much weight. Of course, these interpretive tools are
not always dispositive, and there might be strong stare decisis reasons
not to eliminate the Equal Protection Clause's application to all polit-
ical rights. But the Equal Protection Clause's extension to include
political access of would-bejuors is of recent vintage, and the kind of
expectations that might have built up around such an extension are
hard to imagine.26
261 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412-14 (1991).
262 See id. (involving criminal defendant); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991) (involving civil litigants).
263 The only criterion that could be affected by the means of juror exclusion is the
excluded juror's ability to litigate her rights. As the Court in Powers pointed out, would-be
jurors would have difficulty obtaining injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the
threat of illegal peremptories under modern ripeness doctrine. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-110 (1983)). Butjurors excluded
by laws governing the venire establishment would lack adequate incentive to sue, see Powers,
499 U.S. at 415, and are thus unlikely to vindicate their rights, see id., such that third-party
standing is appropriate.
264 Results reached under equal protection might be justified under other legal theo-
ries. For example, the one-person, one-vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), might obtain under a sophisticated reading of the Republican Guarantee Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. SeeJoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisrmUsr (1980). That the
Republican Guarantee Clause might guard against certain kinds of voting discrimination
(e.g., geographical) that are not protected by a voting discrimination amendment does not
necessarily have implications forjury service. The Republican Guarantee Clause might be
read to ensure broad-based participation only when people are voting on their state consti-
tution-their own form of government-and not necessarily when people are choosing
ordinary laws or ordinary lawmakers. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republi-
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In any event, to the extent that the Court might persist in using
equal protection in this context, equal protection law at the very least
ought to take account of the norms of the voting discrimination
amendments. This means, for example, that all jury exclusion on "ac-
count of sex" is constitutionally illegitimate, regardless of how equal
protection law treats "discrimination" against men outside the polit-
ical context. It means also that traditional equal protection rationality
review, which the Court has applied to laws that draw wealth and age
lines, would have to take account of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments' elimination of wealth and age as "legitimate" ba-
ses on which to distinguish persons with respect to the exercise of
political participation rights.
265
The Equal Protection Clause applies in both state and federal
courts, and to all stages of the jury selection process, including per-
emptories. The intent and standing analyses of equal protection
claims of excluded would-be jurors should be identical to that dis-
cussed above in the context of the Fifteenth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments.
C. The Concept of a 'Jury" Itself in the Constitution
A final place to incorporate the insight this Article has tried to
develop is in the concept of a 'Jury" itself, as that term is used in the
Bill of Rights. A body in which groups have been excluded on the
basis of race, sex, wealth, or age is not a constitutional jury at all, the
argument would run.
As noted above, the Court has already held that persons raising
Sixth Amendment claims need not demonstrate that the under-
representation of the cognizable group be purposeful, but only that
the exclusion be inherent in the process. Thus, the intent require-
ment here may be easier to satisfy than in the context of a Twenty-
Sixth Amendment or equal protection claim. 266 The claim under this
can Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO.
L. REv. 749 (1994). Jury service is akin to ordinary day-to-day voting-the running of the
very government set up by the state Constitution.
265 The analysis offered here would not, of course, call into question age distinctions
drawn outside the context of political participation, for example, in the liquor consump-
tion context.
266 But see supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text (discussing argument that equal
protection and Fifteenth Amendment intent requirements can sometimes be satisfied by
little more than a disparate impact showing). It is also worth reiterating here that a person
raising a Sixth Amendment claim does not automatically prevail upon a showing of system-
atic exclusion. Such a showing merely requires the State to demonstrate a strongjustifica-
tion. So, for example, an exemption from jury service for all college students who could
not afford to miss class might if it were narrowly tailored, be legitimate notwithstanding the
underrepresentation of young adults that would result. Cf. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357, 370 (1979) (suggesting that a narrowly tailored domestic caregiver exclusion from
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"definition of a jury" approach would belong to the litigants in the
'Juryless" proceedings, and could be raised only by them.
2 67
This approach is limited by the fact that the right to be tried by a
'jury" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment has been held not
to have any implications for peremptories.2 68 Moreover, the fact that
the grand jury provisions of the Fifth Amendment and the whole of
the Seventh Amendment have not been applied against the States may
create some complications. One could argue that because states need
not provide grand juries or civil petit juries under the Constitution at
all, they can provide bodies that do not measure up to the Constitu-
tion's inclusive definition of a jury. But this argument is far from an
obvious winner. After all, states might not have to permit initiative
process voting, and yet if they do they cannot leave out blacks, women,
poor persons, or eighteen year olds.
2 69
CONCLUSION
Rights of political participation are logically and historically dis-
tinct from, and in some ways more basic than, individual freedoms
from government intrusion. The criteria by which a person or group
may be excluded legitimately from partaking in the "[second] most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process"
270
are thus of obvious importance to our constitutional democracy. Yet
we lack a coherent theory about which groups count and why. We
need to do better, and the constitutional text, structure, history, and
judicial interpretations provide more help to us than we currently
recognize.
jury service might be valid notwithstanding the underrepresentation of women on juries
that might result).
267 In such cases, there would be no need for third party standing, inasmuch as the
possessors of the right have adequate incentives to raise it. In federal criminal cases, how-
ever, Article III may require a constitutionally adequate jury, regardless of the desire of the
criminal defendant to waive the Sixth Amendment right. See Amar, supra note 92, at 1196-
99.
268 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352 (1991) (insisting that defendant challenging peremptories prove intentional exclusion
of minority jurors).
269 Cf Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979) (suggesting that use of race in selec-
tion of state grand jury foreperson would be actionable); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501
(1972) ("[I1f a State chooses, quite apart from constitutional compulsion, to use a grand or
petit jury, due process imposes limitations on the composition of that jury.").
270 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
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